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[이재명 대통령께] 한국의 2026년 제81차 유엔총회 사형 모라토리엄 결의안 공동제안국 참여

org — Thu, 08 Oct 2026 08:35:48 +0000

2026년 10월 7일 이재명 대통령 귀하 04383대한민국 서울특별시 용산구 이태원로 22 대통령실 전자우편: president@president.go.kr 참조: 한성숙 국무총리 세종특별자치시 다솜로 261 정부세종청사 팩스: +82 44 200 2144 조현 외교부장관 서울특별시 종로구 사직로8길 60 외교부 청사 팩스: +82 2 2100 7934 내용: 한국의 2026년 제81차 유엔총회 사형 모라토리엄 결의안 공동제안국 참여 이재명 대통령께 우리는 제81차 유엔 총회에서 한국 정부가 2년마다 있는 사형집행 모라토리엄 결의안에 공동제안국으로 참여하여 인간 존엄의 존중과 인권의 향상과 점진적 발전에 기여할 것을 촉구합니다. 사형제 폐지는 분명 글로벌 트렌드입니다.¹ 한국에서 마지막 사형 집행이 있었던 1997년말 법적 및 실질적 사형 폐지국은 총 102개국(모든 범죄에 대한 사형 폐지국은 총 61개국)이었습니다.² 2007년말 한국이 실질적 사형 폐지국이 된 2007년말 법적 및 실질적 사형 폐지국은 총134개국(모든 범죄에 대한 사형 폐지국은 총 91개국)으로 늘어났습니다.³ 2025년말 그 수는 더 늘어나 총 145개국(모든 범죄에 대한 사형 폐지국은 총 113개국)이 되었습니다.⁴ 이 글로벌 트렌드는 유엔 총회에서의 표결 패턴에도 반영되고 있습니다. 2007년 12월 유엔 총회는 사상 최초의 사형집행 모라토리엄 결의인 결의 62/149호를 찬성 106표, 반대 46표, 기권 34표로 채택하였습니다.⁵ 2020년 12월 한국은 찬성 123표, 반대 38표, 기권 24표로 채택된 결의 75/183호에 찬성함으로써 격년으로 채택되어 온 결의 찬성국 대열에 처음으로 합류하였습니다.⁶ 2024년 12월 결의 79/179호는 역대 최다인 찬성 130표, 반대 32표, 기권 22표로 채택되었습니다.⁷ 우리는 사형 집행이 생명권을 포함한 기본적 인권을 존중할 한국의 국제법적 의무에 부합되지 않는다는 점을 상기합니다. 1993년 11월 23일 이후 거의 33년간을 사형 판결 하에 살아온 원언식 씨를 포함하여 56명이 여전히 사형수로 있는 것은 고문 및 그 밖의 잔혹한, 비인도적인 또는 굴욕적인 대우나 처벌을 방지할 한국의 국제법적 의무 위반에도 해당될 수 있습니다. 유엔 인권 전문가들은 최근 “사형수 현상(death row phenomenon)” (가혹한 감금 여건에서 임박한 사형 집행을 기다리며 장기간 사형수로 지내는 데 따른 심리적 효과)이 오랫동안 비인도적 대우로 규정되어 온 것을 재차 강조하였습니다.⁸ 앞서 1989년 유럽인권재판소는 소어링 대 영국(Soering v. United Kingdom) 사건에서 이를 근거로 미국으로의 조건 없는 범죄인 인도를 막은 바 있습니다.⁹ 어떠한 형사사법체계도 완벽하지 않다는 점에 주목하는 것이 중요합니다. 경찰, 검찰, 법원은 2000년 익산 약촌오거리 택시기사 살인사건 및 1988년 화성 연쇄살인 8차 사건에서 오심을 막지 못했습니다. 무죄가 밝혀진 사람은 언제든지 감옥에서 석방될 수 있지만 사형에 처해진 경우 되살릴 수 없습니다. 우리는 또한 국회의원들이 1999년 이후 현 제21대 국회를 포함하여 매 대마다 총10건의 사형 폐지법안을 발의한 것에 주목합니다.¹⁰ 2018년 국회의원들은 ‘사형제 폐지를 위한 시민적 및 정치적 권리에 관한 국제규약 제2 선택의정서’ 가입 지지 결의안을 발의했습니다.¹¹ 이들 법안 중에는 당시 국회의원의 절반 이상이 공동발의한 경우도 있었고, 지금 여당은 국회에서 필리버스터를 막을 수 있는 다수 의석을 점하고 있습니다. 정성호 전임 법무부장관은 인권변호사 출신으로 2004년 이후 의원으로 재직했던 역대 국회에서 사형폐지법안을 일관되게 공동발의해왔습니다. 헌법재판소는 사형제에 대해 1996년 7대 2 표결(95헌바1), 2010년 5대 4 표결(2008헌가23)로 두 차례 합헌 결정을 내렸습니다. 그러나 이제 헌법재판소는 2019년 2월 12일 접수되어 현재 7년 넘게 계류 중인 사건(2019헌바59)에서 사형제에 대해 위헌 결정을 내림으로써 사형제 폐지의 길을 열 수 있습니다. 제81차 유엔 총회에서 한국의 사상 최초의 사형 모라토리엄 결의안 공동제안국 참여는 헌법재판소에 계류 중인 사건에서 정부의 입장을 분명히 할 것입니다. 우리는 또한 한국 정부가 “국제법상 의무에 부합되게 적절한 법적 형벌의 결정을 포함한 자국의 법제도를 스스로 발전시킬 모든 나라의 주권적 권리”를 재확인하려 하는 싱가포르가 선봉에 선 이른바 “주권 수정안(sovereignty amendment)”을 적극적으로 반대할 것을 요청합니다. 정치, 경제, 문화 체계와 무관하게 모든 인권과 기본적 자유를 증진시키고 보호할 국가의 의무를 무시할 “주권적 권리”는 없습니다. 우리는 또한 한국이 강제송환 금지 원칙을 위반하여 사형 선고가 내려질 위험이 있는 경우에 미국¹², 일본, 중국¹³, 북한¹⁴ 등지로 사람을 추방 및 인도하는 것을 멈출 것을 촉구합니다. 우리는 2002년 자유권규약 위원회가 로저 저지 대 캐나다(Roger Judge v. Canada) 사건에서 “[사형에 관한 ‘시민적 및 정치적 권리에 관한 국제규약’ 제6조] 제2항에서 제6항의 예외는 ‘사형을 폐지하지 아니하고 있는’ 당사국만이 원용할 수 있다. 사형 폐지국의 경우, 사람을 실존하는 사형 집행의 위험에 노출시키지 않을 의무가 있다. 따라서 사형 폐지국은 개인들에게 사형이 선고될 것이 합리적으로 예상 가능한 경우, 이들을 사형 집행의 방지 보장 없이 추방이나 범죄인 인도를 통하여 자국 관할권으로부터 퇴거시킬 수 없다”고 한 것에 주목합니다.¹⁵ 감사합니다.

서명자(2026년 10월 7일 기준)

아시아 사형폐지 네트워크(ADPAN) 국제인권연맹(FIDH) 인권옹호자(TAHR) 더불어 사형폐지(ECPM) 전환기 정의 워킹그룹(TJWG) 세계사형폐지연합(WCADP)

1 사형제와 관련하여 세계 각국은 (1) 모든 범죄에 대한 완전한 사형 폐지국, (2) 전시범죄 같은 예외적 범죄를 제외한 일반 범죄만에 대한 사형 폐지국, (3) 10년 넘게 사형 집행이 없는 실질적 사형 폐지국, 그리고 (4) 사형 존치국 4부류로 나뉩니다. 첫 세 부류에 속하는 나라는 합쳐서 법적 또는 실질적 사형 폐지국이라 불립니다.

2 Amnesty International, The death penalty worldwide: Developments in 1997, 31 March 1998, Index Number: ACT 50/004/1998, pp. 3 and 23, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/004/1998/en

3 Amnesty International, The death penalty worldwide: Developments in 2007, 15 April 2008, Index Number: ACT 50/002/2008, APPENDIX 1- LIST OF ABOLITIONIST AND RETENTIONIST COUNTRIES AS OF 1 JANUARY 2008; https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/002/2008/en

4 Amnesty International, Death sentences and executions in 2025, 18 May 2026, Index Number: ACT 50/0778/2026, ANNEX II: ABOLITIONIST AND RETENTIONIST COUNTRIES AS OF 31 DECEMBER 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/0778/2026/en

5 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2007: 62/149. Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, A/RES/62/149, 26 February 2008, https://undocs.org/A/RES/62/149

6 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2020: 75/183. Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, A/RES/75/183, 28 December 2020, https://undocs.org/A/RES/75/183

7 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 2024: 79/179. Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, A/RES/79/179, 19 December 2024, https://docs.un.org/A/RES/79/179

8 OHCHR, UN experts warn of associated torture and cruel punishment: World Day Against the Death Penalty (10 October 2022); https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/10/un-experts-warn-associated-torture-and-cruel-punishment

9 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom (Application no. 14038/88), Judgment, (7 July 1989), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57619

10 대한민국 국회, 사형폐지특별법안(유재건의원 외 90인), 의안 제152463호, 1999. 12. 7. 제안, https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=016007; 사형폐지에관한특별법안(정대철의원등 63인 외 92인), 의안 제161085호, 2001. 10. 30. 제안, https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=017199; 사형폐지에관한특별법안(유인태의원등 175인), 의안 제171129호, 2004. 12. 9. 제안, https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=029510; 사형폐지에 관한 특별법안(박선영의원등 39인), 의안 제1800928호, 2008. 9. 12. 제안, https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=PRC_V0K8H0P9L1U2I1O0R4A9K3S6X2M7O8; 사형폐지에 관한 특별법안(김부겸의원등 53인), 의안 제1806259호, 2009. 10. 8. 제안, https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=PRC_G0V9B1C0R0A8Y1S1F1H4F0Z3F6D2N9; 사형폐지에 관한 특별법안(주성영의원등 10인), 의안 제1809976호, 2010. 11. 22. 제안, https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=PRC_I1U0M1X1C2V2X1M3G3J2E0B5X4N4B1; 사형 폐지에 관한 특별법안(유인태의원 등 172인), 의안 제1915958호, 2015. 7. 6. 제안, https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=PRC_K1M5Z0N7F0G6S1T3Z5Q5K1F1J4T3H0; 사형 폐지에 관한 특별법안(이상민의원 등 75인), 의안 제2022856호, 2019. 10. 10. 제안, https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=PRC_G1U9L1S0W1C0J1I4P3W7Q1J6R9C9T6; 사형 폐지에 관한 특별법안(이상민의원 등 30인), 의안 제2112795호, 2021. 10. 7. 제안, https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=PRC_P2K1H1I0C0B7F0V9D2D4H5N7Z1V2N6; 사형 폐지에 관한 특별법안(박지원의원 등 65인), 의안 제2206080호, 2024. 11. 29. 제안, https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=PRC_C2B4W0V6U0S3B1C3A4B1Z2H1G2H9G7

11 대한민국 국회, 시민적 및 정치적 권리에 관한 국제규약 제2선택의정서 가입 촉구 결의안(금태섭의원 등 32인), 의안 제2015870호, 2018. 10. 4. 제안, https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/billDetail.do?billId=PRC_Y1J8L1W0U0B4E1W8N0L1P5C1Q0W9N1

12 강지남, “미국 보내면 사형… 제발 내 아들 살려주오”, 주간동아, 2008. 4. 2., https://weekly.donga.com/List/3/all/11/84713/1

13 김기윤, “조선족→한족→한국인 신분 세탁한 30년 전 중국 공안 살해범 송환”, 동아일보, 2022. 5. 18., https://www.donga.com/news/Society/article/all/20220518/113468246/1

14 HRW, “South Korea Investigates Forcible Return of Two North Koreans: Inquiry Should be Credible, Impartial, Independent”, 22 July 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/22/south-korea-investigates-forcible-return-two-north-koreans

15 HRC, Roger Judge v. Canada, Views, Communication No. 829/1998, para. 10.4, https://undocs.org/CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998

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보도자료 코로나19-팬데믹 전과 후 북한의 처형 매핑

org — Mon, 27 Apr 2026 20:04:58 +0000

김정은 정권 처형장 최소 46곳 지도 그려보니 평양 10곳 중 절반이 4대 세습 노리는 金집무실 가까이 TJWG, “집권 초 처형 일삼다가 김정은 국제형사재판 회부 겁나 주춤, 코로나19에 국경 잠그고 국제압력 느슨해지니 처형 다시 폭증” 보고서 전문 게시: https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea 인권조사기록단체인 전환기정의워킹그룹(TJWG)은 2026년 4월 28일(한국시간) 『코로나19 팬데믹 전과 후 북한의 처형 매핑 (Mapping North Korea’s Executions Before and After the COVID-19 Pandemic)』 보고서를 발간하며 김정은 집권 13년간(2011년 12월 17일~2024년 12월 16일) 처형 및 사형선고 현황과 46개 처형장소를 지도로 공개했다. 이 조사기록 프로젝트는 전미민주주의기금(National Endowment for Democracy)의 후원으로 2015년부터 11년째 이어지고 있다. 세계 200여개 인권단체 연대로 프랑스에 사무국을 둔 세계사형제폐지연합(WCADP)이 이번 보고서를 지지한다고 밝혔다. TJWG는 오는 6~7월 파리에서 개최되는 제9차 사형폐지 세계회합(The 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty)에서 이란과 중국 등 사형을 체제 존속 수단으로 남용해온 나라로 북한을 국제적으로 각인할 계획이다. 데이터 • 김정은 집권기에 북한 51개 시·군에 거주한 탈북민 265명의 진술과 북한 내부 취재원을 둔 5개 북한전문매체 보도를 일별하여 데이터 속성이 호환되도록 표준화하여 통합 분석. • 144회의 처형/사형선고(처형 136회 358명, 집행 미상 사형선고 최소 8회 9명)의 연도별 추이, 전국적 분포, 처형 유형, 처형 장소, 처형 방법, 사형 죄목 분석. 새 분석법 • 국제범죄분류(ICCS)를 북한 처형실태 분석에 처음으로 도입하여 사형 죄목 분류하고 변화 추적. • 특정한 시점 또는 사형 법령 제·개정 전후 변화 비교 가능해짐. 처형 지역, 처형장 • 지역: 34개 시·군에서 처형. • 5대 처형 지역: 량강도 혜산시, 평양, 함경북도 청진시, 함경남도 함흥시, 함경북도 회령시. • 처형장소: 김정은 집권 13년간 처형 집행장소 46곳 식별(40곳 좌표 공개). • 평양: “김정은 집무실”, “1호 청사”로 알려진 조선로동당 중앙위원회 본부 청사 10km 반경 내 5곳.

• 코로나19 국경봉쇄 이후 5년간 처형 전국화: 평양과 북동부 3개 도(함경북도, 함경남도, 량강도) → 도급 시 전체(평양, 남포, 개성, 라선)와 8개 도(함경북도, 량강도, 자강도, 평안북도, 평안남도, 강원도, 황해북도, 황해남도)로 확대. 처형 현황, 유형, 방법 • 규모: 최소 136회 집행, 최소 358명 처형(1회 최대 19명, 회당 평균 약 2.6명). • 유형: 공개처형 72.8%, 비공개처형 22.5%, 형식적 재판조차 없는 초사법적 약식 처형 4.7%. • 방법: 총살 96.4%, 교수형 1.8%, 둔기 1.8% • 처형 연 10회 넘은 5개년: 집권 첫 3년(2012~2014)과 코로나 19 대유행 첫 2년(2020~2021). • 최다연도: 처형 인원은 2013년(80명 이상), 횟수는 2020년(24회). • 국제압력 고조시 처형 피하다가 국경 잠그고 다시 남발: 유엔 북한인권조사위원회(COI) 보고서 계기로 김정은 등 북한 지도부 국제형사재판소(ICC) 회부 논의 활발했던 2015~2019년 처형 줄다가 코로나19 이유로 국경 봉쇄한 2020년 처형 급증. 국경 봉쇄 이후 5년간 처형 및 사형선고는 116.7% 증가하고, 인원은 247.7% 증가. 사형 이유 • K-문화, 종교 등 의식변화 막으려는 사형 최대 증가: 국경봉쇄 전 최다였던 살인(고의살인, 과실치사)에 대한 사형은 44.4% 감소한 반면, 국경봉쇄 후 K-드라마, K-무비, K-팝 등 한국문화와 종교 및 미신 행위에 대한 사형이 250% 증가. • 사형 인원은 김정은 지시 위반, 불만 표출 등 정치적 범죄에서 최대: 600% 증가.

• 비관적 전망: 정권 4대 세습 추구하며 문화사상 통제, 정치적 지배 위한 처형 늘릴 위험 높음. 김씨 일가의 대물림되고 만성화된 인명 경시는 국제안보와 평화 파괴로 이어진다. “자국민 인명 경시가 만성화되도록 북한정권에 대한 단호한 국제 조치를 지체한 결과, 김정은은 수천, 수만 명의 청년들을 푸틴의 우크라이나 침략에 보내 소모품으로 죽게 하고 유럽의 안보평화를 파괴하는 지경이 됐습니다. 우리는 러시아 파병 군인과 해외 파견 인력에 대한 자의적 처형 실태도 파악하여 북한의 반인도범죄와 국제평화에 대한 위협, 초국가적 인권탄압까지 심각성을 부각하는 작업을 확장할 것입니다.”_이영환 대표 필요한 대응과 책임규명 방향 “북한의 광범위하고 체계적으로 벌어지는 자의적 사형 집행은 2014년 COI가 반인도범죄(crime against humanity)로 확인한 후 일부 축소된 것으로 보였으나 COVID-19 팬데믹 이후 다시 확대되고 있습니다. 국제사회가 이러한 반인도범죄를 억지하고 처벌하기 위해서는 책임자에게 국제형사법상 책임을 묻고자 설립된 시리아, 미얀마, 아프가니스탄, 이란, 콩고민주공화국, 베네수엘라 관련 유엔 책임규명 기구를 참조하여 새로운 국제 책임규명 메커니즘이나 상설 COI나 진상조사단(FFM)을 설치하는 것을 검토해야 합니다.”_신희석 법률분석관 후속조사 계획과 목표 “코로나19 차단 명분으로 국경을 봉쇄한 후 처형이 116.7% 폭증한 것은 김정은의 잔혹한 통치 방식을 재확인해줍니다. 이 기간 제정된 반동사상문화배격법, 비상방역법, 평양문화어보호법처럼 더 많은 사형을 할 수 있는 '법적 도구'가 늘어난 이후의 변화를 분석하고, 관련 기관과 책임자에 대한 조사를 더 할 것입니다.”_류민종 선임연구원 “2015년 이래로 880명 이상의 탈북민으로부터 김일성-김정일-김정은 정권기의 처형에 관한 진술을 1,000개 이상 확보했습니다. 지금까지 축적한 위치와 사건 데이터베이스를 시계열 지도화(time series mapping) 할 것입니다. 특정 장소에서 얼마나 거듭 처형이 벌어지고, 처형장소에 변화가 있으며, 처형의 계절별, 월별, 시간대별 특징이 있는지 분석할 것입니다. 후속보고서와 함께 동적 시각화 작업 결과를 영상으로 제작해 공개할 것입니다.”_조성휘 GIS매핑·데이터매니저

전환기정의워킹그룹(Transitional Justice Working Group) 2014년 서울에 설립된 인권조사기록 및 애드보커시 NGO입니다. 무력분쟁이나 독재 체제로부터 전환 중이거나 아직 전환이 이루어지지 않은 사회에서 대규모 인권침해를 다루는 모범 사례를 개발하고, 피해자 중심 접근으로 배상을 실현하고 가해자 책임을 규명하는 것을 목표로 활동합니다. 대규모 잔학행위에 대한 인권 조사기록과 책임규명을 선도하는 기관 및 개인과 협력하고 경험을 공유합니다. 아시아사형폐지네트워크(ADPAN), 세계사형제폐지연합(WCADP), 국제인권연맹(FIDH), 국제형사재판소를 위한 연합(CICC)의 회원단체입니다.

Press Release Mapping North Koreas Executions Before and After the COVID-19 Pandemic

org — Mon, 27 Apr 2026 20:04:25 +0000

Mapping 46 execution sites under the Kim Jong-un regime reveals half of 10 sites in Pyongyang are located near the Kim Jong-un office amid fourth succession push

TJWG “After frequent executions in the early years of Kim Jong-un’s rule, the regime became more restrained amid discussions on referring Kim Jong-un to the International Criminal Court, but executions surged again after the COVID-19 border closure and the decline in international pressure.”

Full report available at: https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea

On April 28, 2026 (Seoul time), the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), a human rights documentation and advocacy NGO, released its report,“Mapping North Korea’s Executions Before and After the COVID-19 Pandemic.” The report provides a comprehensive look at the current status of executions and death sentencings, as well as a map of 46 executions sites during the 13 years of Kim Jong-un’s rule (December 17, 2011 – December 16, 2024).

This project has been ongoing since 2015, supported by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The World Coalition Against Death Penalty (WCADP), a global network of over 200 human rights organizations headquartered in France, expressed its support for the report. TJWG also plans to raise international awareness of North Korea as a country that has allegedly abused the death penalty as a tool of regime survival, alongside countries such as Iran and China, at the 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty, to be held in Paris in June-July this year.

Data

• Data were standardized and cross-validated to ensure compatibility across sources, including testimonies from 265 North Korean defectors who lived across 51 cities and counties during Kim Jong-un’s era, as well as reporting from 5 North Korea-focused media outlets with sources inside North Korea.

• The report analyzes 144 cases of executions and death sentencings—including 136 executions involving 358 individuals and at least 8 death sentencings involving 9 individuals with unknown execution status—as well as annual trends, nationwide distribution, execution types and locations, and the categories of capital offenses.

New analytical approach

• The report introduces the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS) for the first time to analyze executions in North Korea, enabling systematic classification of capital offenses and tracking of changes over time.

• This approach allows comparisons across specific time periods and before-and-after analyses of the enactment or revision of death penalty laws.

Execution regions and sites

• Regions: Execution were carried out across 34 cities and counties.

• Top 5 execution regions: Hyesan City, Ryanggang Province; Pyongyang; Chongjin City, North Hamgyong Province; Hamhung City, South Hamgyong Province; and Hoeryong City, North Hamgyong Province.

• Execution sites: 46 execution sites have been identified over the 13 years of Kim Jong-un’s rule, with the coordinates of 40 sites disclosed.

• Pyongyang: 5 sites are located within a 10-km radius to “Kim Jong-un’s office”(Headquarters of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea).

• Nationwide expansion of executions over 5 years following the COVID-19 border closure: Executions have expanded from Pyongyang and three northeastern provinces (North Hamgyong, South Hamgyong, and Ryanggang) to all province-level cities (Pyongyang, Nampo, Kaesong, and Rason) and 8 provinces (North Hamgyong, Ryanggang, Chagang, North Pyongan, South Pyongan, Kangwon, North Hwanghae, and South Hwanghae).

Execution status, types, and methods

• Scale: At least 136 executions were documented, resulting in at least 358 individuals being executed (up to 19 people per case, with an average of approximately 2.6 people per case).

• Types: Public executions (72.8%), non-public executions (22.5%), extrajudicial summary executions carried out without even a perfunctory trial (4.7%).

• Methods: Shooting (96.4%), hanging (1.8%), blunt instrument (1.8%).

• Years with more than 10 executions: The first three years of Kim Jong-un’s rule (2012-2014) and the first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021).

• Peak Years: The highest number of individuals executed was in 2013 (over 80 individuals), while the highest number of cases was documented in 2020 (24 cases).

• Avoiding executions under heightened international pressure, then resuming after the border closure: Executions declined from 2015 to 2019 amid discussions following the UN COI report and potential ICC referral of North Korean leadership, including Kim Jong-un. However, executions surged in 2020 following the COVID-19 border closure. Over the 5 years after the border closure, executions and death sentencings increased by 116.7%, and the number of individuals by 247.7%.

Capital offenses

• Largest increase in execution aimed at suppressing ideological change, including South Korean culture and religion: While executions for homicide (intentional and negligent), which were the most common before the border closure, decreased by 44.4%, capital offenses related to South Korean culture including K-dramas, films, and K-pop, as well as religious and superstitious practices, increased by 250% after the border closure.

• The number of condemned persons for political offenses, including violations of Kim Jong-un’s directives and expressions of dissent, grew by 600%.

• Pessimistic outlook: As the regime pursues a 4th hereditary succession of power, there is a high risk of increased executions to strengthen cultural and ideological control and maintain political dominance.

The Kim family’s inherited and chronic disregard for human life leads to the destruction of international security and peace.

“As a result of delaying decisive international measures against the North Korean regime for its entrenched disregard for human life, Kim Jong-un has sent thousands-if not tens of thousands-of young people to die as expendable in Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, destroying security and peace in Europe. We will expand our work to document arbitrary executions of troops deployed to Russia, as well as abuses against overseas workers, further highlighting North Korea’s crimes against humanity, its threats to international peace, and its transnational repression.”

_ Hubert Younghwan Lee, Executive Director

Addressing accountability gaps

“The widespread and systematic use of arbitrary capital punishment in North Korea, which appeared to have been somewhat curtailed after its identification as a crime against humanity by the COI in 2014, has expanded again following the COVID-19 pandemic. To deter and punish this crime against humanity, the international community should consider the creation of a new accountability mechanism or permanent COI or fact-finding mission (FFM) to hold those responsible to account under international criminal law, taking into consideration the practice of the UN accountability bodies for Syria, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Iran, the DRC and Venezuela.”

_ Ethan Hee-seok Shin, Legal Analyst

Follow-up investigation plans and objectives

“The 116.7% surge in executions within North Korea—carried out under the cover of COVID-19 lockdowns—reconfirmed Kim Jong-un’s brutal governance. We will analyze the shifting patterns of executions and the 'legal tools' used to issue more death sentences, such as the Reactionary Thought and Culture Rejection Law, the Emergency Quarantine Law, and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Law, which were all enacted during this period. Furthermore, we will further document the institutions and individuals responsible for the expansion of inhumane executions.”

_ Minjong Ryu, Lead Researcher

“Since 2015, we have secured more than 1,000 testimonies from over 880 North Korean defectors regarding executions under the Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un regimes. We will conduct time-series mapping of the locations and cases documented in our database to analyze the frequency of executions at specific sites, identify shifts in execution locations over time, and detect seasonal, monthly, or time-of-day patterns. With the follow-up report, we plan to produce and release dynamic visualization of our findings in a video format.”

_ Seonghwi Cho, GIS Mapping and Data Manager

About Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG)

Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) is a human rights documentation and advocacy NGO established in Seoul in 2014 that aims to develop best practices to address mass human rights violations and to realize reparation and judicial accountability through a victim-centered approach in societies that are making a transition from or have yet to make a transition from armed conflict or dictatorship. TJWG also cooperates and shares experience with organizations and individuals who lead work in human rights documentation and accountability for mass atrocities. TJWG is a member organization of the Anti-Death Penalty Asia Network (ADPAN), the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty (WCADP), the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), and the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC).

제61차 유엔 인권이사회 채택 예정 2026년도 북한인권결의안

org — Wed, 25 Mar 2026 05:03:12 +0000

2026년 3월 24일 이재명 대통령 귀하 참조: 김민석 국무총리, 조현 외교부장관, 정동영 통일부장관 내용: 제61차 유엔 인권이사회 채택 예정 2026년도 북한인권결의안 이재명 대통령께 우리는 한국 정부가 제61차 유엔 인권이사회의 연례 북한인권 결의안 공동제안국에 불참할 것으로 보인다는 뉴스 보도에 우려를 표합니다.¹ 우리는 한국 정부가 이를 재고하고, 결의안의 주요 내용 삭제에 신중한 접근을 요구하는 등 적극적 역할을 할 것을 촉구합니다. 북한의 인권상황이 심각하다는 사실은 잘 알려져 있습니다. 2014년 유엔 북한인권 조사위원회(COI DPRK)는 북한 정부가 국가 정책에 따라 “절멸, 살해, 노예화, 고문, 수감, 강간, 강제낙태와 기타 성폭력, 정치/종교/인종/성별을 이유로 한 박해, 주민의 강제이주, 사람들의 강제실종, 고의적으로 장기간 굶기는 비인도적 행위”를 포함한 인도에 반한 죄(crimes against humanity)를 자행했다고 판단했습니다. 이러한 판단에 따라 유엔 인권이사회와 총회는 북한의 인권침해를 강력히 규탄하고 책임규명 노력과 메커니즘의 강화를 요구하는 결의를 정기적으로 채택해왔습니다. 한국은 이러한 노력에서 불가결한 역할을 해왔습니다. 한국 정부는 2008년 말부터 2018년까지 매년 유엔 총회와 인권이사회에서 북한 인권의 증진과 보호를 요구하는 북한인권결의안에 공동제안국으로 참여하여 북한 주민의 기본권 증진을 위한 의지를 재확인했습니다. 그러나 우리는 이재명 정부의 대북 접근 방식이 기존에 한국의 인권에 대한 의지로부터 후퇴하는 것으로 보이는 것에 깊이 우려하고 있습니다. 한국 정부는 북한 쪽으로 정보가 담긴 풍선을 보내는 시민단체의 활동을 제한하고 대북 방송을 중단함으로써 북한 사람들에게 검열받지 않고 요긴한 정보를 제공하는 이니셔티브를 막았습니다. 2025년 8월 통일부는 연례 북한인권보고서 발간을 중단했고, 9월 탈북민 고용·창업 지원을 전담한 자립지원과를 해체했으며, 10월에는 인권인도실과 납북자대책팀 해체를 결정했습니다. 이들 조치는 총체적으로 북한 억압의 피해자에 대한 지지로부터 멀어지는 우려스러운 시그널이 되고 있습니다. 2019년부터 2022년까지 한국은 “한반도 평화와 번영”을 통한 북한인권 증진을 주장하며 북한인권결의안에 공동제안국으로 참여하기를 거부하였습니다. 그러나 이 접근 방식은 남북한 관계에 대한 종합적이거나 원칙에 입각한 정책을 반영하지 못했습니다. 한국 정부는 명시적으로, 그리고 묵시적으로 인권 고려를 배제했고, 책임규명과 피해자 보호를 희생해가면서 대북 관여를 추구했습니다. 가장 경악스러웠던 것은 2019년 11월 한국의 탈북 어부 2명 강제송환으로 이들을 거의 확실한 고문, 노예화, 그리고 강제실종 또는 처형이 기다리는 곳으로 돌려보낸 것이었습니다. 이 조치는 한국의 국내법상 의무와 개인이 고문이나 박해에 직면할 상당한 우려가 있는 곳으로의 강제송환을 금지하는 시민적 및 정치적 권리에 관한 국제규약과 고문 및 그밖의 잔혹한·비인도적인 또는 굴욕적인 대우나 처벌의 방지에 관한 협약 등 국제조약상 약속을 위반했습니다. 이러한 조치는 원칙 없는 관여 접근 방식의 깊은 도덕적 및 정책적 결점을 드러냈습니다. 2022년말 한국은 다시 북한인권 북한인권결의안에 공동제안국으로 복귀했습니다. 이재명 정부가 이제 올해 북한인권 결의안 공동제안을 포기한다면 이는 국내적으로, 그리고 국제적으로 깊이 우려스러운 시그널을 보내게 될 것입니다. 그러한 결정은 인권의 보편성을 무너뜨릴 뿐만 아니라 법의 지배와 인간의 존엄을 지키는 민주주의 국가로서 한국의 지위를 저하시킬 것입니다. 한국은 북한인권 문제에 리더십을 발휘해야 합니다. 이 중요한 결의안의 공동제안을 끝내는 것은 그 반대가 될 것입니다. 우리는 한반도의 지속가능한 평화는 인권 배제로 이룩할 수 없다는 점을 강조합니다. 한반도의 항구적 평화를 위해서는 북한내 불안정과 고통을 부채질하는 억압의 구조를 직면하는 것이 요구됩니다. 대화와 관여는 책임규명과 진실과 함께 가야 합니다. 진정한 화해는 북한의 끔찍한 인권침해에 대한 침묵이나 부정 위에 세워질 수 없기 때문입니다. 인권을 무시하는 것은 잠시 긴장이 완화된 것으로 보이게 할 수는 있지만 불안정을 부채질하는 문제점은 남아있고, 진짜 평화를 성취하는 것은 더욱 어렵게 됩니다. 우리는 대통령께서 대통령 취임 후 처음으로 맞이하는 유엔 인권이사회의 연례 북한인권 결의안에 공동제안국으로 참여하여 북한의 중대한 인권문제에 대해 원칙에 입각한 입장을 취할 것을 요청합니다. 한편, 우리는 앞서 2024년4월 4일자 유엔인권이사회 결의 55/21호 및 2025년 4월 3일 유엔인권이사회 결의 58/17호 본문 문단 6에서 모든 국가들이 “난민, 망명 요청자, 그 밖의 조선민주주의인민공화국 공민의 연고 및 활동에 관한 조선민주주의인민공화국 정부와의 정보 공유를 자제함으로써 충분한 국제 보호를 보장할 것(to ensure adequate international protection by refraining from sharing information about the contacts and conduct of refugees, asylum-seekers and other citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea)”을 강력히 촉구했던 내용이 2026년 3월 17일 유럽연합(EU)과 호주가 주요 제안국으로서 제출한 북한인권 결의안(A/HRC/61/L.15) 본문 문단 7에서 삭제된 것에 우려를 표명합니다.² 이는 중국이 탈북민인 김금성 씨의 어머니를 고문, 강제노동, 성적 폭력, 강제실종의 우려에도 불구하고 송환시키려 하고 있는 현재 특히 잘못된 메시지를 보낼 위험이 있습니다. 우리는 또한 북한에서 지난 수십 년간 국가 최상위층에서 수립된 정책에 따라 절멸, 살해, 노예화, 고문, 구금, 강간, 강제낙태와 그 밖의 성적 폭력, 정치, 종교, 인종, 젠더 사유에 근거한 박해, 주민의 강제이주, 강제실종, 알면서 장기 기아를 초래한 비인도적 행위에 의한 반인도범죄(crimes against humanity)가 자행되어 왔다는 2014년 유엔 북한인권조사위원회(COI DPRK) 보고서의 핵심 내용을 담은 기존 북한인권 결의 본문 문단 7이 2026년 3월 17일 제출된 북한인권 결의안에서 삭제되고 언급이 제한된 것 또한 북한에 잘못된 메시지를 보낼 것이 우려됩니다. 2026년 3월 17일 제출된 북한인권 결의안의 본문 문단 26에서 독립된 필요 평가(independent needs assessments)에 “구금 시설의 취약자(persons experiencing vulnerability in detention centres)”를 포함하라는 기존 결의의 내용이 삭제된 것도 역시 우려되는 부분입니다. 한국이 탈북민과 북한 주민의 인권이 관련된 이러한 결의안 표현의 삭제에 대해 신중한 접근을 요구하고, 제61차 인권이사회에서 결의안이 그대로 채택될 경우, 향후 결의안에 원래 표현을 복구하기 위해 노력할 것을 제안합니다. 감사합니다. 국제인권연맹(FIDH) 전환기정의워킹그룹(TJWG)

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1 신규진, 이윤태, “정부, 北인권결의안 제안 불참땐 文정부 이후 4년만”, 동아일보(2026.03.24), https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20260324/133591394/2 ; 임여익, “[단독] 정부, 유엔 北 인권결의안 불참 기류…조기 공동제안국에서 빠져”, 뉴스1 (2026.03.24), https://www.news1.kr/nk/politics-diplomacy/6111889

2 61st session of the HRC, “Draft resolutions, decisions and President’s statements”, https://hrcmeetings.ohchr.org/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/61/Pages/resolutions.aspx

CED LoT - ROK joint submission by TJWG TAHR ADPAN

org — Tue, 24 Feb 2026 09:27:13 +0000

The Republic of Korea’s Compliance with International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance

Suggested List of Themes

Submitted by Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG),

The Advocates for Human Rights (TAHR),

a non-governmental organization in special consultative status with ECOSOC since 1996,

and

Anti-Death Penalty Asia Network (ADPAN)

for the 30th Session of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances (9 – 19 Mar 2026)

Submitted 24 February 2026

The Advocates for Human Rights (The Advocates) is a volunteer-based non-governmental organization committed to the impartial promotion and protection of international human rights standards and the rule of law since its founding in 1983. The Advocates conducts a range of programs to promote human rights in the United States and around the world, including monitoring and fact finding, direct legal representation, education and training, and publication. The Advocates is the primary provider of legal services to low-income asylum seekers in the Upper Midwest region of the United States. The Advocates is committed to ensuring human rights protection for women around the world. The Advocates has published more than 25 reports on violence against women as a human rights issue, provided consultation and commentary of draft laws on domestic violence, and trained lawyers, police, prosecutors, judges, and other law enforcement personnel to effectively implement new and existing laws on domestic violence. In 1991, The Advocates adopted a formal commitment to oppose the death penalty worldwide and organized a death penalty project to provide pro bono assistance on post-conviction appeals, as well as education and advocacy to end capital punishment. The Advocates currently holds a seat on the Steering Committee of the World Coalition against the Death Penalty. Anti Death Penalty Asia Network (ADPAN) is the peak regional body for organisations and individuals committed to the abolition of the death penalty across the Asia Pacific, with members from 20 countries within the region. As such, ADPAN maintains that the death penalty violates the right to life, that it is the ultimate form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment and that the death penalty should be entirely abolished internationally. This report examines a number of issues for inclusion in the list of themes. The first concerns the three points related to the two domestic implementing bills for the Enforced Disappearance Convention pending in the 22nd National Assembly (section 1), namely: the criminalization of enforced disappearance committed by North Korea (DPRK) and other “non-states” with respect to article 4 of the Convention (section 1-1) and the application of the non-refoulement rule to North Korea and other “non-states” with respect to article 16 of the Convention (section 1-2), arising from the peculiar legal status of North Korea (DPRK) in South Korean law, and the death penalty provision with respect to article 7 of the Convention (section 1-3). The report also covers South Korea’s policy and practice concerning refoulement where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance with respect to article 16 of the Convention in relation to North Korean escapees (section 2-1) and other foreign nationals (section 2-2) and the National Intelligence Service (NIS)’s formalized role in the Ministry of Justice (MOJ)’s internal review body, the Refugee Committee, for refugee applications (section 2-3). Lastly, the report provides a list of suggested questions to be posed to the government (section 3). 1. The two domestic implementing bills for the Enforced Disappearance Convention pending in the 22nd National Assembly There are currently two bills pending before the 22^nd National Assembly (30 May 2024 – 29 May 2028), proposed respectively by members of the two main political parties: the Kim Gi-hyeon bill (bill no. 2201373) proposed on 4 July 2024 and the Kim Young-bae bill (bill no. 2204872) proposed on 24 October 2024 (see Annex). Both bills are mostly similar in content and apparently based on the drafts discussed by the Enforced Disappearance Convention implementing legislation committee [법무부 강제실종방지협약 이행입법위원회], which was convened by the Ministry of Justice in October 2020. The committee, composed of officials from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense and senior jurists and experts of international law, human rights law and criminal law, held in-depth discussion for a year and a half. It was headed by Judge O-Gon Kwon, who presided over the trial of Radovan Karadžić at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ITCY) and served as the President of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC. Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea provides that “The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands”. It has been the consistent South Korean constitutional practice since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 that North Korea (DPRK) is “an anti-state organization [반국가단체]” unlawfully occupying a portion of its sovereign territory. North Korea therefore is not considered “a state” under South Korean law. 1-1. The criminalization of enforced disappearance committed by North Korea (DPRK) and other “non-states” with respect to article 4 of the Convention In 2014, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the DPRK (COI DPRK) found that: “from 1950 until the present, the DPRK has engaged in the systematic abduction, denial of repatriation and subsequent enforced disappearance of persons from other countries on a large scale and as a matter of State policy. Well over 200,000 persons who were taken from other countries to the DPRK may have potentially become victims of enforced disappearance, as defined in the Declaration for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.”¹ The COI DPRK added that: “The vast majority of abductions and enforced disappearances occurred during or are otherwise linked to the Korean War and the organized movement of ethnic Koreans from Japan that started in 1959. However, hundreds of nationals of the ROK, Japan and other states were also abducted and disappeared between the 1960s and 1980s. In more recent years, the DPRK abducted a number of DPRK and ROK nationals from the People’s Republic of China.”² Because South Korea does not consider North Korea “a state”, under South Korea’s interpretation and application of the definition of “enforced disappearance” in article 2 of the Convention, acts perpetrated by North Korea or its agents will not constitute the crime of enforced disappearance unless an additional condition or clarification is added. The Kim Gi-hyeon bill provides the definition of “enforced disappearance” in article 3 that “acts of organs of anti-state organization under article 2(1) of the National Security Act or acts done under the authorization, support or acquiescence of the anti-state organization are also considered acts of the enforced disappearance actors, etc. The definition of “enforced disappearance” in article 3 of the Kim Young-bae bill does not contain similar a proviso. On June 9, 2025, the National Human Rights Commission adopted a set of recommendations urging the speedy adoption of legislation for the domestic implementation of the Enforced Disappearance Convention.³ The first of Commission’s recommendations was that:

With respect to the definition of “enforced disappearance”, stipulate in a manner that includes North Korea in “enforced disappearance actor, etc.”, taking into consideration the proposal to express the agent of enforced disappearance as “a State or a political organization” like article 9(2)(8) of the Act on Punishment, etc. of Crimes under Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court or the proposal to express it as “all entities that have the capacity to sign, ratify or accede to this Convention in accordance with article 38 of the Enforced Disappearance Convention” in light of North Korea’s status for the purpose of international conventions.⁴

The National Human Rights Commission’s recommendation, in particular the reference to “all entities that have the capacity to sign, ratify or accede to this Convention in accordance with article 38 of the Enforced Disappearance Convention”, all Member States of the United Nations in other words, appears to provide the most elegant solution using neutral language. It also has the added advantage of ensuring that enforced disappearance committed by a UN member state that is not recognized as a state by South Korea for various reasons in the future (there are currently none) will be criminalized under South Korean law. Given the subjective nature of state recognition, the Committee may consider providing general guidance on the matter. This issue arises again with respect to the non-refoulement rule. 1-2. The application of the non-refoulement rule to North Korea and other “non-states” with respect to article 16 of the Convention Similar to the definition of enforced disappearance, because South Korea does not consider North Korea “a state”, refoulement to North Korea will not be considered a refoulement to “another State” under article 16 of the Convention unless an additional condition or clarification is added. The non-refoulement clause in article 15 of the Kim Gi-hyeon bill and article 17 of the Kim Young-bae bill does not address this concern. As described below in section 2-1, this is not merely a theoretic consideration, but a legal loophole that could allow the repetition of refoulement of North Korean escapees. The National Human Rights Commission recommended in its opinion of June 9, 2025 that:

Prohibit forcible repatriation to North Korea taking into consideration proposals to include North Korea among states to which the prohibition of forcible repatriation, etc. applies, as mentioned in paragraph 1, to express the agent of enforced disappearance as “a State or a political organization” like article 9(2)(8) of the Act on Punishment, etc. of Crimes under Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court or to express it as “all entities that have the capacity to sign, ratify or accede to this Convention in accordance with article 38 of the Enforced Disappearance Convention” in light of North Korea’s status for the purpose of international conventions.⁵

Again, the National Human Rights Commission’s recommendation, in particular the reference to “all entities that have the capacity to sign, ratify or accede to this Convention in accordance with article 38 of the Enforced Disappearance Convention”, all Member States of the United Nations in other words, appears to provide a solution using neutral language that covers all 193 UN member states. However, this will still leave open the possibility of refoulement to non-UN member states where there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance. There is also the risk of deportation to non-state actors exercising de facto government functions. A more complete solution therefore would be to include unrecognized states and “non-state actors that exercise government-like functions and de facto control over territory and population must respect and protect the human rights of individuals and groups”.⁶ Given the subjective nature of statehood, the non-refoulement clause of future human rights treaties, such as the proposed Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, should revise the standard language to provide broader protection against refoulement. 1-3. The death penalty provision with respect to article 7 of the Convention Article 10(1) of the Kim Gi-hyeon bill and article 11(1) of the Kim Young-bae bill both provides that a person who commits [the crime of enforced disappearance], thereby killing a person subjected to enforced disappearance shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or for not less than 7 years. Article 13 of the Criminal Act, which is a part of the General Provisions of the Criminal Act, stipulates that acts committed without criminal intent are, as a rule, not punishable unless provided otherwise and, by virtue of article 8 of the Criminal Act, the General Provisions of the Criminal Act applies to all criminal provisions in the Criminal Act and other laws.⁷ Article 10(1) of the Kim Gi-hyeon bill and article 11(1) of the Kim Young-bae bill, if enacted, would therefore allow a death sentence for the intentional killing of a person subjected to enforced disappearance. Article 250 of the Criminal Act, read in conjunction with article 13 of the Criminal Act, provides that a person who kills another, intentionally, shall be punishable by death or imprisonment for life or for not less than 5 years. The punishment prescribed in article 10(1) of the Kim Gi-hyeon bill and article 11(1) of the Kim Young-bae bill, including the death penalty, appears to have been calculated taking article 250 of the Criminal Act into consideration. The death penalty for the intentional killing of a person subjected to enforced disappearance appears to be in line with article 6(2) of the ICCPR permitting the imposition of a death sentence only for “the most serious crimes”, which has been interpreted as “crimes of extreme gravity involving intentional killing” by the Human Rights Committee⁸ and the Human Rights Council in its resolutions 48/9 of 8 October 2021, 54/35 of 13 October 2023 and 60/17 of 7 October 2025. However, the death penalty provision in article 10(1) of the Kim Gi-hyeon bill and article 11(1) of the Kim Young-bae bill clearly violates the Human Rights Committee’s restatement in paragraph 34 of general comment no. 36 that “States parties may not transform into a capital offence any offence that, upon ratification of the Covenant or at any time thereafter, did not entail the death penalty”. In addition, it is important to note that South Korea is a de facto abolitionist state as it has last carried out executions in December 1997, though there are 57 people on death row as of June 2025. There is also a case pending before the Constitutional Court, originally filed in 2019, challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty (case no. 2019 Hun-Ba 59), but as of February 2026, no ruling has been made. This is the third case before the Constitutional Court which twice upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty by a 7-2 vote on 28 November 1998 (case no. 95 Hun-Ba 1) and by a 5-4 vote on 25 February 2010 (case no. 2008 Hun-Ga 23). Therefore, the government and the National Assembly should enact an implementing bill without creating new capital offenses. 2-1. South Korea’s policy and practice concerning refoulement of North Korean escapees with respect to article 16 of the Convention On 7 November 2019, the Government deported two defectors from North Korea suspected of committing a mutiny and murder of 16 crew members aboard a fishing vessel before their defection on 2 November. The Government claimed that deportation was justified since they were “grotesque criminals” and not “sincere” defectors.⁹ On 28 January 2020, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment sent a joint allegation letter to South Korea stating that they “are deeply concerned about the decision made by [the South Korean] Government of repatriating both individuals to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea where citizens often face serious human rights violations upon return according to our well-documented cases, including enforced disappearance, arbitrary execution, torture and ill-treatment, and trials that do not conform to international standards for fairness”.¹⁰ The Human Rights Committee (HRC) in October 2023 (CCPR/C/KOR/CO/5, paras. 37-38), the Committee against Torture (CAT) in July 2024 (CAT/C/KOR/CO/6, paras. 30-31) and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in May 2025 (CERD/C/KOR/CO/20-22, paras. 31-32) raised concerns about refoulement of North Korean escapees and recommended legal reform to protect them against such refoulement. 2-2. South Korea’s policy and practice concerning refoulement of other foreign nationals with respect to article 16 of the Convention South Korea has deported a number of other foreign nationals who were subsequently subjected to enforced disappearance. On 21 March 2012, an Uzbek asylum-seeker was deported for using a fake passport even though it was necessary to flee to South Korea because he was already being targeted by the Uzbek authorities for his wife’s wearing of a hijab.¹¹ He was reported as missing by his family after repatriation from South Korea to Uzbekistan. On 26 November 2024, the South Korean police announced that an Uzbek national on Interpol’s wanted persons list for an assassination attempt on a former presidential aide in Uzbekistan on 26 October 2024, was arrested three days earlier on 23 November and has since been deported to Uzbekistan. It is questionable that the deported Uzbek national, who had fled to South Korea on a tourist visa, had an opportunity to challenge the deportation order in court in less than three days following his arrest or that South Korea sought credible and effective assurances from Uzbekistan against exposing him to the risk of enforced disappearance and other human rights violations have been obtained.¹² On 28 April 2022, South Korea deported Jin Yinsu, or “Mr. Kim,” a Chinese national of Korean ethnicity who had fled China after killing a Chinese police officer in November 1993, following his arrest by the South Korean authorities in November 2019 and the dismissal of his administrative lawsuits against the deportation order of 14 May 2020 by the Daejeon District Court on 28 January 2021 (case no. 2020 Gu-Dan 850), the Daejeon High Court on 16 September 2021 (case no. 2021 Nu 10406) and the Supreme Court on 27 January 2022 (case no. 2021 Du 56329).¹³ Mr. Jin’s fate and whereabouts remain unknown. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in May 2025 (CERD/C/KOR/CO/20-22, paras. 29-30) raised concerns about refoulement to China and recommended that South Korea should guarantee respect for the principle of non-refoulement, including by ensuring that the right of asylum-seekers to lodge asylum applications at ports of entry is effectively guaranteed in practice and ensuring the application of clear and transparent procedures for refugee status determination and related appeals, in line with international standards. 2-3. The National Intelligence Service (NIS)’s formalized role in the Ministry of Justice (MOJ)’s internal review body, the Refugee Committee, with respect to article 16 of the Convention The Ministry of Justice (MOJ)’s internal review body created under the Refugee Act to hear administrative appeals against the decisions made by the immigration officials, the Refugee Committee [난민위원회], includes the National Intelligence Service (NIS)’s head of counterintelligence corps, in accordance with Article 2(2)(3) of the detailed operational rules for the Refugee Committee (Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice no. 1378, last revised on 25 August 2021).¹⁴ The NIS’s risk assessment about the refugee applicant’s country of origin plays a decisive role in practice. The formal role of intelligence officers in the refugee status determination is difficult to rationalize or justify and other government offices, like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), should collect and share information about the countries of origin and publish the country-specific assessment to provide objective guidelines and to strengthen transparency in the refugee determination process. This would better ensure that asylum-seekers are unduly denied a proper review and exposed to the risk of refoulement. 3. List of suggested questions The coauthors suggest that the Committee pose the following questions to the Government:

What discussions or consultations have authorities had to criminalize enforced disappearance committed by North Korea or other “non-states” in the domestic implementing bills for the Enforced Disappearance Convention?
What discussions or consultations have authorities had to ban refoulement to North Korea or other “non-states” in the domestic implementing bills for the Enforced Disappearance Convention?
What discussions or consultations have authorities had about eliminating references to the death penalty in the draft domestic implementing bills in the domestic implementing bills for the Enforced Disappearance Convention, consistent with South Korea’s obligations under ICCPR Article 6 and its de facto abolitionist status?
What discussions or consultations have authorities had to prevent refoulement of North Korean escapees where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance?
What discussions or consultations have authorities had to prevent refoulement of foreign nationals where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance?
What discussions or consultations have authorities had to reform the Ministry of Justice (MOJ)’s internal review body, the Refugee Committee, so that information about the country of origin is provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other government bodies, rather than the National Intelligence Service (NIS), to reduce the asylum-seekers’ refoulement?

Annex:

The Two Domestic Implementing Bills for the Enforced Disappearance Convention

Pending in the 22^nd National Assembly

Bill for the Act on Punishment of Crime of Enforced Disappearance, Prevention of Enforced Disappearance and Remedies for Victims (bill no. 2201373) proposed by 11 members including Kim Gi-hyeon on 4 July 2024¹⁵

Bill for the Act on Punishment of Crime of Enforced Disappearance, Prevention of Enforced Disappearance and Remedies for Victims (bill no. 2204872) proposed by 11 members including Kim Young-bae on 24 October 2024¹⁶

Article 1 (Purpose)

The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the realization of justice by providing for provisions necessary for the prevention of enforced disappearance, punishment of the crime of enforced disappearance and remedies for the victims of enforced disappearance, etc. in accordance with the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and rules of international law, UN resolutions, etc. related to enforced disappearance.

Article 1 (Purpose)

Article 2 (Basic Ideas)

(1) No one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance.

(2) Enforced disappearance cannot be justified in time of war, armed conflict or similar national emergency.

Article 2 (Basic Ideas)

(1) No one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance.

(2) Enforced disappearance cannot be justified in time of war, armed conflict or similar national emergency.

Article 3 (Definitions)

The terms used in this Act shall be defined as follows:

1. The term “enforced disappearance” means any of the following acts committed by a state organ or an individual or a group composed of individuals (with respect to the crime of enforced disappearance, this means a state organ or an individual who belongs to a group and commits the crime of enforced disappearance. Hereinafter, “enforced disappearance actors, etc.”) acting under the authorization, support or acquiescence of the state; provided that acts of organs of anti-state organization under article 2 (1) of the National Security Act or acts done under the authorization, support or acquiescence of the anti-state organization are also considered acts of the enforced disappearance actors, etc.

(a) The arrest, detention, kidnapping, abduction or deprivation of liberty by other means (hereinafter “deprivation of liberty”) of a person followed by the concealment (including where one refuses to provide information or provides false information) of information concerning the fact of deprivation of liberty or personal information, survival, whereabout, etc. of the person deprived of liberty;

(b) The refusal to provide information or provision of false information by a person who has obligation to provide information prescribed in item (a).

2. The term “crime of enforced disappearance” means crimes referred to from Articles 7 to 12;

3. The term “victim of crime of enforced disappearance” means a person who was subjected to the crime of enforced disappearance (including a person who died).

4. The term “victim of enforced disappearance” means a victim of crime of enforced disappearance and his/her spouse (including a de facto spouse), lineal ascendant and descendant, and brother and sister.

Article 3 (Definitions)

The terms used in this Act shall be defined as follows:

1. The term “enforced disappearance” means any of the following acts committed by a state organ (including a local self-governing organizations and a public institution in accordance with article 4 of the Act on the Management of Public Institutions) or an individual or a group composed of individuals (with respect to the crime of enforced disappearance, this means a state organ or an individual belonging to it, an individual or an individual belonging to a group who commits the crime of enforced disappearance. Hereinafter, “enforced disappearance actors, etc.”) acting under the authorization, support or acquiescence of the state.

(a) The arrest, detention, kidnapping, abduction or deprivation of liberty by other means (hereinafter “deprivation of liberty”) of a person followed by the denial of the deprivation or liberty and the concealment (including where one refuses to provide information or provides false information) of information concerning the fact of deprivation of liberty or personal information, survival, whereabout, etc. of the person deprived of liberty.

(b) The refusal to provide information or provision of false information by a person who has obligation to provide information prescribed in item (a).

2. The term “crime of enforced disappearance” means crimes referred to from Articles 8 to 13;

3. The term “forcibly disappeared person” means a person who was subjected to the crime of enforced disappearance (including a person who died).

4. The term “victim of crime of enforced disappearance” means a victim of crime of enforced disappearance and his/her spouse (including a person in de facto marital relationship), lineal ascendant and descendant, brother and sister and other individuals who suffered harm as the direct result of crime of enforced disappearance.

Article 4 (Standards of Interpretation)

(1) The interpretation and application of this Act shall be in accordance with the contents and purpose of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and treaties ratified or acceded to by the Republic of Korea, the generally recognized rules of international law and resolutions of international organizations to which the Republic of Korea is a member related to universal human rights issues including enforced disappearance.

(2) The interpretation and application of this Act shall respect the interpretation and application related to enforced disappearance by the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID), the Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) and other international and regional organizations.

Article 4 (Scope of Application related to Crime of Enforced Disappearance)

(1) This Act shall apply to any Korean or foreign national who commits crime of enforced disappearance within the territory of the Republic of Korea.

(2) This Act shall apply to any Korean national who commits crime of enforced disappearance outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.

(3) This Act shall apply to any foreign national who commits crime of enforced disappearance on board a vessel or aircraft registered in the Republic of Korea, while outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.

(4) This Act shall apply to any foreign national who commits crime of enforced disappearance against the Republic of Korea or its nationals outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.

(5) This Act shall apply to any foreign national who commits crime of enforced disappearance outside the territory of the Republic of Korea and is in the territory of the Republic of Korea.

Article 5 (Scope of Application related to Crime of Enforced Disappearance)

(1) This Act shall apply to any Korean or foreign national who commits crime of enforced disappearance within the territory of the Republic of Korea.

(2) This Act shall apply to any Korean national who commits crime of enforced disappearance outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.

(4) This Act shall apply to any foreign national who commits crime of enforced disappearance against the Republic of Korea or its nationals outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.

(5) This Act shall apply to any foreign national who commits crime of enforced disappearance outside the territory of the Republic of Korea and is in the territory of the Republic of Korea.

Article 5 (Relationship to other Acts, etc.)

For the crime of enforced disappearance, this Act shall apply in precedence, provided that for the crime of enforced disappearance amounting to crimes against humanity pursuant to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Act on Punishment, etc. of Crimes under Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, the provisions therein shall govern.

Article 6 (Relationship to other Acts, etc.)

For the crime of enforced disappearance, this Act shall apply in precedence, provided that for the crime of enforced disappearance amounting to crimes against humanity pursuant to article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and article 9 of the Act on Punishment, etc. of Crimes under Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, the provisions therein shall govern.

Article 6 (Special Provisions concerning Prescription of Public Prosecution)

(1) The crime of enforced disappearance under Article 10 shall not be subject to the prescription for public prosecution provided for in Articles 249 to 253 of the Criminal Procedure Act and Articles 291 to 295 of the Military Court Act.

(2) The prescription of public prosecution for the crime of enforced disappearance referred to in the provisions other than Article 10 shall commence from the latest time among the time when the acts referred to in each item of Article 3 (1) end and the time when the survival and whereabouts of victims of crime of enforced disappearance are ascertained, notwithstanding Article 252 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act and Article 294 (1) of the Military Court Act.

Article 7 (Special Provisions concerning Prescription of Public Prosecution)

(1) The crime of enforced disappearance under Article 11 shall not be subject to the prescription for public prosecution provided for in Articles 249 to 253 of the Criminal Procedure Act and Articles 291 to 295 of the Military Court Act.

(2) The prescription of public prosecution for the crime of enforced disappearance referred to in the provisions other than Article 11 shall commence from the latest time among the time when the acts referred to in each item of Article 3 (1) end and the time when the survival and whereabouts of victims of crime of enforced disappearance are ascertained, notwithstanding Article 252 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act and Article 294 (1) of the Military Court Act.

Article 7 (Crime of Enforced Disappearance)

(1) An enforced disappearance actor, etc. who commits the crime referred to in Article 3 (1) (a) shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 2 years and not more than 25 years.

(2) An enforced disappearance actor, etc. who commits the crime referred to in Article 3 (1) (b) shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 1 year and not more than 15 years.

Article 8 (Crime of Enforced Disappearance)

(1) An enforced disappearance actor, etc. who commits the crime referred to in Article 3 (1) (a) shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 2 years and not more than 25 years.

(2) An enforced disappearance actor, etc. who commits the crime referred to in Article 3 (1) (b) shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 1 year and not more than 15 years.

Article 8 (Receiving and Harboring of Disappeared Person)

A person who receives or harbors a person subjected to enforced disappearance by the crime referred to in Article 7 (1) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 15 years.

Article 9 (Receiving and Harboring of Disappeared Person)

A person who receives or harbors a person subjected to enforced disappearance by the crime referred to in Article 8 (1) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 15 years.

Article 9 (Inflicting or Causing Bodily Injury by Enforced Disappearance)

A person who commits the crime referred to in Article 7, thereby inflicting or causing the injury to a person subjected to enforced disappearance shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 3 years.

Article 10 (Inflicting or Causing Bodily Injury by Enforced Disappearance)

A person who commits the crime referred to in Article 8, thereby inflicting or causing the injury to a person subjected to enforced disappearance shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 3 years.

Article 10 (Killing or Causing Death by Enforced Disappearance)

(1) A person who commits the crime referred to in Article 7, thereby killing a person subjected to enforced disappearance shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or for not less than 7 years.

(2) A person who commits the crime referred to in Article 7, thereby causing death of a person subjected to enforced disappearance shall be punished by imprisonment for life or for no less than 5 years.

Article 11 (Killing or Causing Death by Enforced Disappearance)

(1) A person who commits the crime referred to in Article 8, thereby killing a person subjected to enforced disappearance shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or for not less than 7 years.

(2) A person who commits the crime referred to in Article 8, thereby causing death of a person subjected to enforced disappearance shall be punished by imprisonment for life or for no less than 5 years.

Article 11 (Attempts)

Any attempt to commit the crimes referred to in Articles 7 to 10 shall be punished.

Article 12 (Attempts)

Any attempt to commit the crimes referred to in Articles 8 to 11 shall be punished.

Article 12 (Preparations, Conspiracies)

An official, etc. who makes preparations or conspires with intent to commit the crimes referred to in Articles 7 to 10 shall be punished.

Article 13 (Preparations, Conspiracies)

An official, etc. who makes preparations or conspires with intent to commit the crimes referred to in Articles 8 to 11 shall be punished.

Article 13 (Responsibilities of Superiors, etc.)

(1) When a superior (including those actually exercising the power of superiors; hereinafter the same shall apply) of an organization or an institution aware that subordinates under his/her effective command or supervision are committing or intending to commit the crime of enforced disappearance fails to take any of the following measures, not only shall those who commit such crime of enforced disappearance shall be punished, but the superiors thereof shall also be subject to punishment provided for in each of the relevant Articles.

1. Necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crime of enforced disappearance;

2. Notification of cases to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution of the crime of enforced disappearance

(2) When a superior neglects or abandons his/her duties and thereby fails to prevent or repress the commission of the crimes referred to in Article 10 by subordinates under his/her effective command or supervision, he/she shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 7 years.

(2) When a superior neglects or abandons his/her duties and thereby fails to prevent or repress the commission of the crimes referred to in Articles 7 to 9 by subordinates under his/her effective command or supervision, he/she shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 5 years.

(4) The provisions of paragraphs (1) to (3) shall be without prejudice to the higher standards of responsibility applicable under relevant international law to a military commander (including a person effectively exercising the authority of a commander).

Article 14 (Responsibilities of Superiors, etc.)

1. Necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the crime of enforced disappearance;

2. Notification of cases to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution of the crime of enforced disappearance

(2) When a superior neglects or abandons his/her duties and thereby fails to prevent or repress the commission of the crimes referred to in Article 11 by subordinates under his/her effective command or supervision, he/she shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 7 years.

(2) When a superior neglects or abandons his/her duties and thereby fails to prevent or repress the commission of the crimes referred to in Articles 8 to 10 by subordinates under his/her effective command or supervision, he/she shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 5 years.

Article 14 (Mitigation of Punishment)

(1) If a person who has committed the crimes referred to in Articles 7, 8, 9, 11 or 13 effectively contributes to bringing the disappeared person forward alive, the punishment may be mitigated.

(2) If a person who has committed the crimes referred to in Articles 7 to 13 makes it possible to clarify cases of enforced disappearance or to identify the persons who committed the crime of enforced disappearance.

Article 15 (Mitigation of Punishment)

(1) If a person who has committed the crimes referred to in Articles 8 to 10, 12 and 14 effectively contributes to bringing the disappeared person forward alive, the punishment may be mitigated.

(2) If a person who has committed the crimes referred to in Articles 8 to 14 makes it possible to clarify cases of enforced disappearance or to identify the persons who committed the crime of enforced disappearance.

Article 16 (Crime of Enforced Disappearance by Non-State Actor)

If an individual or an individual belonging to a particular organization that is not an enforced disappearance actor commits the crimes referred to in Article 8 to 14, the punishment may be mitigated.

Article 15 (Prohibition of Forcible Repatriation, etc.)

The State shall not expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance.

Article 17 (Prohibition of Forcible Repatriation, etc.)

Article 16 (Prescription for Claim for Damages)

The period of prescription for claims arising from enforced disappearance shall not progress until the latest time among the time when the acts referred to in each item of Article 3 (1) end and the time when the survival and whereabouts of victims of enforced disappearance are ascertained.

Article 18 (Prescription for Claim for Damages)

Article 17 (State Obligation to Provide Remedies) The state shall take appropriate measures of remedies, including rehabilitation, restoration of honor and social reintegration, for victims of enforced disappearance.

Article 19 (State Obligation to Provide Remedies) The state shall take appropriate measures of remedies, including rehabilitation, restoration of honor and social reintegration, for victims of crime of enforced disappearance.

Article 18 (Protection of Children)

The state shall consider as top priority the interest of children affected by enforced disappearance and endeavor to protect their rights and interests.

Article 20 (Protection of Children)

The state shall consider as top priority the interest of children affected by enforced disappearance and endeavor to protect their rights and interests.

Addenda

This Act shall enter into force 6 months after the date of its promulgation.

Addenda

This Act shall enter into force 6 months after the date of its promulgation.

Download the English PDF

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1 Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (7 February 2014), para. 1011.

2 Ibid, para. 1013.

3 National Human Rights Commission, “An opinion expressed to speedily work out legislative act for effective domestic implementation of the Enforced Disappearance Convention [「강제실종방지협약」의 실효적 국내 이행을 위한 법률 조속히 마련하도록 의견표명]” (2025-07-02), https://www.humanrights.go.kr/base/board/read?boardManagementNo=24&boardNo=7611312 [in Korean]

4 The Korean original is: “1. ‘강제실종’의 정의와 관련하여, 강제실종 행위 주체를 ｢국제형사재판소 관할 범죄의 처벌 등에 관한 법률｣(이하 ‘국제형사범죄법’이라 한다) 제9조 제2항 제8호와 같이 ‘국가 또는 정치단체’로 표현하는 방안, 북한의 국제협약상 지위를 참조하여 ‘강제실종방지협약 제38조에 따라 이 협약에 서명ㆍ비준ㆍ가입할 수 있는 모든 주체’로 표현하는 방안 등을 고려하여 ‘강제실종행위자등’에 북한이 포함될 수 있도록 규정할 것.”

5 The Korean original is: “5.‘강제송환 등의 금지’ 적용 대상 국가에 ‘북한’이 포함될 수 있도록, 강제송환 금지 대상 ‘국가’를, 제1항에서 언급한 것처럼, 국제형사범죄법 제9조 제2항 제8호와 같이‘국가 또는 정치단체’로 표현하거나, 북한의 국제협약상 지위를 참조하여 ‘강제실종방지협약 제38조에 따라 이 협약에 서명ㆍ비준ㆍ가입할 수 있는 모든 주체’로 표현하는 방안 등을 고려하여 북한으로의 강제송환을 금지할 것”

6 OHCHR, “Joint Statement by independent United Nations human rights experts on human rights responsibilities of armed non-State actors” (25 February 2021), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/02/joint-statement-independent-united-nations-human-rights-experts-human-rights WGEID, “Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances”, A/HRC/42/40 (30 July 2019), para. 94, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/42/40 A/HRC/WGEID/1: Revised methods of work of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, adopted in February 2023 (6 April 2023), para. 33, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/working-methods/ahrcwgeid1-revised-methods-work-working-group-enforced-or-involuntary OHCHR, “Fact Sheet No. 6 (Rev. 4): Enforced Disappearances” (31 March 2023), p. 36, https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-no-6-rev-4-enforced-disappearances OHCHR, “Afghanistan: Four years after Taliban takeover, UN experts repeat warning against normalisation of gender oppression”, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/statements/Taliban-takeover-gender-oppression-Afghanistan-warning-normalisation-1-en.pdf

7 Criminal Act [Enforcement Date 08. Aug, 2023.] [Act No.19582, 08. Aug, 2023., Partial Amendment], https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=253323&viewCls=engLsInfoR

8 Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36: Article 6: right to life, CCPR/C/GC/36 (3 September 2019), para. 35.

9 Hyonhee Shin, South Korea forcibly deported only two of 200 North Korean fishermen since 2010, ministry says, Reuters, July 15, 2022, accessed Jan. 24, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/skorea-forcibly-deported-only-two-200-nkorean-fishermen-since-2010-ministry-2022-07-15

10 Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Information received concerning the announcement made by the Government of the Republic of Korea on 7 November 2019, AL KOR 3/2019, ( Jan. 28, 2020), 1, accessed Jan. 24, 2025, https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24975.

11 Ji-Heon Kim, 정부, 난민신청 우즈벡인 강제송환 논란 (Controversy over government’s forcible repatriation of Uzbek who had applied for asylum), Yonhap News, Apr. 3, 2012, accessed Jan. 24, 2025, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20120402109200004.

12 Kim Hyun-soo, S. Korea extradites suspect in assassination attempt on Uzbek official, Yonhap News , Nov. 26, 2024, accessed Jan. 24, 205, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20241126008400315; Lee Dong-hwan, Suspect in Uzbek politician assassination attempt caught and deported from Korea, Yonhap News, Nov. 26, 2024, accessed Jan. 24, 2025, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20241126107600004; Chae, Mine-seok, Interpol Red Notice suspect wanted for assassination attempt of high-ranking Uzbek politician arrested in Korea, Seoul Economic Daily, Nov. 26, 2024, accessed Jan. 24, 2025, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/2DGZUEVR6C

13 Kim Ki-yoon, The killer of a Chinese Public Security officer from 30 years ago who had laundered his identity repatriated, Dong-A Ilbo, May 18, 2022, https://www.donga.com/news/Society/article/all/20220518/113468246/1.

14 The original Korean version is: 난민위원회 운영세칙 [시행 2021. 8. 25.] [법무부훈령 제1378호, 2021. 8. 25., 일부개정], https://www.law.go.kr/admRulLsInfoP.do?chrClsCd=&admRulSeq=2100000257468

15 [2201373] 강제실종범죄 처벌, 강제실종의 방지 및 피해자의 구제 등에 관한 법률안(김기현의원 등 11인), https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/bi/billDetailPage.do?billId=PRC_N2O4N0N6L2M8L1S6T4R7S4Q7R0P6X1 [in Korean]

16 [2204872] 강제실종범죄의 처벌, 강제실종의 방지 및 피해자의 구제 등에 관한 법률안(김영배의원 등 11인), https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/bi/billDetailPage.do?billId=PRC_F2E4F0D9D1B9Y1Y3W4X9V3W8U4V8D7 [in Korean]

CED LoT submission - TJWG Mulmangcho THINK

org — Tue, 24 Feb 2026 09:26:03 +0000

TJWG – Transitional Justice Working Group

Mulmangcho

THINK

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SOUTH KOREA)

Suggested list of themes

Joint submission for the Committee on Enforced Disappearance (CED)

115th Session (22 Apr 2025 - 09 May 2025)

23 February 2026

The Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) is a human rights documentation NGO established in Seoul in 2014 that aims to develop the best practices to address mass human rights violations and to realize victim-centered approach and justice in societies that are making a transition from or have yet to make a transition from armed conflict or dictatorship. Mulmangcho is a non-partisan and non-profit organization founded in Seoul, Korea in 2012. Mulmangcho assists North Korean defectors and the courageous and elderly POWs who have returned to their homes. Mulmangcho pursues research programs to better help those in need and carry out various programs to help to the victims of our history and strives to establish freedom and democracy for other countries. THINK is a North Korean human rights NGO established in 2019, dedicated to promoting the rights of North Korean defectors—especially women and youth—and supporting their resettlement. THINK’s activities include the Korea-Czech Dialogue for the Promotion of North Korean Human Rights held in Prague and Olomouc and the Future Forum for North Korean Youth Refugees. THINK provides direct support, including group counseling for defector women, career guidance and art-based emotional support at alternative schools for defector youth. This joint submission focuses on South Korea’s refoulement of the North Korean escapees and foreign nationals in violation of article 16 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED) as well as the failure to conduct a fact-finding investigation for South Korean POWs from the Korean War and other subsequent armed conflicts and clashes in violation of article 24 of the ICPPED. The forcible repatriation of North Korean escapees (article 16 of ICPPED) South Korea has a long-established policy of accepting North Korean escapees who wish to defect to South Korea as its own citizens. As of December 2025, a total of 34,537 North Korean refugees has arrived in South Korea. When North Korean escapees first come to South Korea, they are sent to the Joint Interrogation Center, which was renamed the Free World Center in October 2021, run by the National Intelligence Service (NIS). The escapees are placed under “temporary protection” at the Center for up to 90 days and this “protection” period can be extended by the authorities if deemed necessary. The government claims that the escapees are not detained against their will, but they cannot claim South Korean nationality and state support unless they go through this process. The interrogation of the escapees at the Center is considered an “administrative procedure” to ascertain the identity and the willingness to be protected by South Korea and not a “criminal procedure”. But the process is designed to screen North Korean spies and Chinese nationals who pose as the escapees to claim the South Korean citizenship and information gathered from the interrogation can be used to bring criminal charges against them for espionage or other crimes. The escapees who are de facto detained at the Center for interrogation that can result in criminal prosecution are not brought promptly before a judge and cannot seek judicial review of the legality of their detention. They are also not entitled to legal counsel. The North Korean escapees are also exposed to the risk of forcible repatriation to North Korea. On 7 November 2019, the government repatriated two North Korean escapees, Mr. Woo Beom-seon and Mr. Kim Hyun-wook, accused of murder to North Korea five days after their arrival by sea on 2 November. The government tried to keep the repatriation a secret, but it was exposed because a cameraman accidentally caught a mobile phone message sent to one of the officials at the National Assembly. The authorities also did not inform the two escapees about their repatriation until the last moment to avoid resistance or suicide attempt. The two escapees were blindfolded and escorted by a special police unit to the hand-over point at the inter-Korean border. The government justified the repatriation on the ground that the two escapees were heinous criminals and their stated desire to defect was “not genuine”. Since 2014, the NIS has hired female lawyers as full-time “human rights protection officers”, but the two escapees were not even informed about the existence of such legal counsel. The fate and whereabouts of the two repatriated escapees remain unknown. The state prosecutors belatedly indicted the top officials responsible for the repatriation for abuse of power in February 2023 and their trial is ongoing. However, to this date, the South Korean government has never formally asked North Korea to clarify their fate and whether their due process and fair trial rights were respected. While article 3 of the Refugee Act bans the forcible repatriation of refugees or asylum-seekers against their will in accordance with article 33 of the Refugee Convention and article 3 of the Torture Convention, the North Korean escapees are not considered refugees or asylum-seekers under the South Korean law because they are deemed to be South Korean citizens. Similarly, because South Korea does not recognize North Korea (DPRK) as a “state”, article 16 of the Convention, according to this interpretation, technically does not bar refoulement of North Korean escapees to North Korea where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance. South Korea’s domestic implementing legislation for the Convention must take this into consideration to ensure the prohibition of refoulement to North Korea as would be the case vis-à-vis any other state. Questions:

Can North Korean escapees be deported to North Korea against their will in spite of the risk of enforced disappearance and South Korea’s obligation of non-refoulement under article 16 of the Enforced Disappearance Convention?
Why did the “human rights protection officers” fail to prevent the forcible repatriation of two North Korean escapees, Mr. Woo Beom-seon and Mr. Kim Hyun-wook, on 7 November 2019?
What steps have been taken to ask North Korea to clarify the fate of the two escapees, Mr. Woo Beom-seon and Mr. Kim Hyun-wook, repatriated on 7 November 2019 and whether their due process and fair trial rights were respected?
Are there plans to ensure that the North Korean escapees under “temporary protection” are brought before a judge and able to seek judicial review of the legality of their detention?
Are there plans to ensure the right to legal counsel for the North Korean escapees under “temporary protection”?
How will South Korea’s domestic implementing legislation for the Convention ensure the prohibition of refoulement to North Korea where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance?

The refoulement of foreign nationals (article 16 of ICPPED) South Korea continues to expel, return ("refouler"), surrender, extradite or otherwise forcibly transfer other foreign nationals even where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance. In March 2012, an Uzbek asylum-seeker was deported for using a fake passport even though it was necessary to flee to South Korea because he was already being targeted by the Uzbek authorities. He was reported as missing by his family after repatriation from South Korea to Uzbekistan. In April 2022, South Korea deported Mr. Jin Yinsu, a Chinese national, accused of murder to China apparently without assurances that he would not be subjected to enforced disappearance or other human rights violations. In November 2024, the South Korean police announced that an Uzbek national on Interpol’s wanted persons list for an assassination attempt on a former presidential aide in Uzbekistan on 26 October 2024, was arrested three days earlier on 23 November and has since been deported to Uzbekistan. The South Korean government apparently did not seek any assurances to ensure that he is not subjected to enforced disappearance. Questions:

What steps have been taken to codify the principle of non-refoulement for foreigners at risk of enforced disappearance in the domestic law?
What is the policy on seeking assurances against enforced disappearance for the deported or extradited individuals?
What steps have been taken to ask Uzbekistan to clarify the fate of the Uzbek nationals deported in March 2012 and November 2024 respectively and to ask China to clarify the fate of Mr. Jin Yinsu deported in April 2022?

The failure to conduct a fact-finding investigation for South Korean POWs from the Korean War and other subsequent armed conflicts and clashes (article 24 of ICPPED) The Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the DPRK (COI) found that at least 50,000 POWs from the ROK were not repatriated after the Korean War (1950-1953) and condemned to a lifetime of forced labor, mostly in coal mines. After the war, families in South Korea of unreturned POWs held in North Korea did not receive any information about the fate of their POW family members and could not have contact with them. The COI considered them to be victims of enforced disappearance (A/HRC/25/CRP.1, paragraphs 861-883). Because North Korea did not provide a full list of South Korean POWs and the South Korean military at the time kept a poor record, most of the POWs’ families were notified that they were killed in action. It also explains why there was no popular movement demanding the return of South Korean POWs after the war—both the families and the public were not aware. Since the 1990s, a total of 80 POWs and about 430 family members have escaped from North Korea and successfully arrived in South Korea. This led to the belated publicization of the scale and gravity of the issue. In 2007 and 2010, the government and the National Assembly enacted laws to create a compensation commission for post-war abductees and a fact-finding investigative commission for wartime abductees. The post-war abductees, mostly fishermen but also other people abducted from South Korea or elsewhere, numbered in thousands, though most were returned after a few months, leaving over 500 abductees in North Korea. The compensation commission published a white paper that detailed the abduction incidents. The fact-finding commission for wartime abductions conducted a far broader investigation as the victims numbered in tens of thousands. After years of investigation, the commission published a comprehensive report and a list of abductees in 2017. However, the government has failed to create a fact-finding commission for POWs. The POW fact-finding bill was first introduced in the 21^st National Assembly on June 24, 2021 but it died in the national defense committee.¹ The POW fact-finding bill was again introduced in the 22^nd National Assembly on January 13, 2024 in the current 22^nd National Assembly, but the bill has made little progress.² Also, the government and the National Assembly recently adopted a new law designating June 28 as the Korean War Abductees Memorial Day [6·25전쟁 납북자 기억의 날]. There is a similar bill pending in the National Assembly which would designate November 26 as the POW Memorial Day [국군포로 기억의 날], but the bill again has made little progress.³ November 26 marks the day when Lieutenant Cho Chang-ho, who was the first known POW to escape from North Korea and return to South Korea was formally discharged from his military service in 1994. In the National Human Rights Commission’s recommendation for the speedy enactment of the domestic implementing legislation for the Enforced Disappearance Convention,⁴ the Commission recommended that “in particular, where there are individual legislative bills concerning fact-finding and compensation for the Korean War wartime abductees, civilian victims by hostile forces, unrepatriated POWs, detainees, etc. pending in the National Assembly, speedy legislative measures should take place”.⁵ Questions:

Why did the government conduct a fact-finding investigation for the Korean War-era civilian abductees and post-war abductees but not for POWs?
What is the government’s position on the bill to create a fact-finding investigative commission for POWs?
What steps have been taken to create a fact-finding investigative commission for POWs?
What is the government’s position on the bill to designate November 26 as the POW Memorial Day?
What steps have been taken to designate November 26 as the POW Memorial Day?
What is the government’s view on the National Human Rights Commission’s recommendation to speedily enact legislative bills concerning fact-finding for POWs?

Download the English PDF

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1 [2111051] 6·25전쟁 국군포로의 진상규명 및 명예회복에 관한 법률안(조태용의원 등 29인), https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/bi/billDetailPage.do?billId=PRC_B2M1Z0V6A1G6R0M9E1M1C2O7Q1B1L2

2 [2207456] 6ㆍ25전쟁 국군포로의 진상규명 및 명예회복에 관한 법률안(김기현의원 등 12인), https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/bi/billDetailPage.do?billId=PRC_J2H5I0Q1Q0P7P1N0O3N7I4J7H4I8G2

3 [2211602] 국군포로의 송환 및 대우 등에 관한 법률 일부개정법률안(김기현의원 등 11인), https://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/bi/billDetailPage.do?billId=PRC_W2E5E0C7B0C1A0A9I1J1H3I3G0H9F5

4 국가인권위원회, 「강제실종방지협약」의 실효적 국내 이행을 위한 법률 조속히 마련하도록 의견표명, https://www.humanrights.go.kr/base/board/read?boardManagementNo=24&boardNo=7611312

5 The Korean original is: “특히, 6·25전시 납북자, 적대세력에 의한 민간인 피해자, 미송환 국군포로, 억류자 등에 대한 진실규명 및 피해 보상과 관련하여 국회에 계류 중인 개별법안이 있는 경우, 신속히 입법 조치가 이루어져야 할 것이고,”

일본 법원의 북송 재일교포 배상판결에 즈음한 국군포로 추심금소송의 신속한 판결 요청 공동성명

org — Wed, 28 Jan 2026 08:23:52 +0000

일본 법원의 북송 재일교포 배상판결에 즈음한 국군포로 추심금소송의 신속한 판결 요청 공동성명

2026년 1월 26일

우리는 가와사키 에이코 (川崎栄子) 씨를 포함하여 탈북한 북송 재일교포 5명이 2018년 8월 일본 도쿄지방재판소에서 ‘지상낙원’이라 속여 데려가 인권을 억압한 북한(조선민주주의인민공화국)을 상대로 5억엔(약 50억원)의 손해배상을 청구한 소송에서 2023년 10월 30일 도쿄고등재판소의 파기환송을 거쳐 26일 도쿄지방재판소에서 승소 판결이 내려진 것을 늦은 감이 없지 않지만 환영합니다. 우리는 이번에 승소한 북송 재일교포 원고들이 일본내 북한 자산을 찾아 배상판결을 집행하여 정의를 실현하고, 또한 오는 제61차 유엔 인권이사회(2026년 2월 23일-4월 2일)에서 채택될 연례 북한인권 결의안에 이른바 ‘귀국사업’에 따라 북한으로 건너간 최소 93,340명의 재일교포와 일본인 가족이 겪은 강제실종 등의 중대한 인권침해를 지금이라도 언급할 것을 촉구합니다. 한편, 우리는 2016년 10월 11일 탈북 귀환 국군포로 한재복, 노사홍 2인이 북한(조선민주주의인민공화국)을 상대로 북한 억류 중 강제노역 등에 대한 손해배상을 청구한 제1차 국군포로 소송에서 2020년 7월 7일 승소 판결이 내려졌고, 뒤이어 귀환 국군포로 김성태, 남소열, 유영복, 이규일, 이원삼 5인이 북한을 상대로 제기한 제2차 국군포로 소송에서도 2023년 5월 8일 승소 판결이 내려진 것을 상기하지 않을 수 없습니다. 그런데 승소한 국군포로와 그 유족이 북한의 출판물·방송물 등 저작권을 위임받아 그 저작권료를 법원에 공탁 중인 사단법인 남북경제문화협력재단(이하 ‘경문협’)의 북한 저작권료에 대한 추심금 소송이 진행 중인 와중에 유영복 1인을 제외한 여섯 분이 돌아가셨음에도 2024년 2월 14일 경문협 상대 추심금소송 항소심 패소 후 사건이 대법원으로 상고된 지 거의 2년이 지났음에도 상고심(2024다223802) 판결이 지연되고 있습니다. 앞서 항소심 판결은 통일부가 뒤늦게 사실조회에 응하여 추가로 제출된 경문협 산하 남북 저작권센터와 북한의 저작권사무국간 계약서를 전혀 언급하지 않았으며, 원고측은 채증법칙 위반을 근거로 대법원에 상고한 상태입니다. 2014년 2월 17일 발간된 유엔 북한조사위원회(COI) 보고서는 북한의 국군포로 수 만명의 억류와 강제노역이 제네바협약 위반으로 반인도범죄(crimes against humanity)에 해당된다고 판단했으며, 작년 12월 18일 유엔 총회에서 만장일치로 채택된 북한인권 결의에서도 북한의 국군포로 송환 거부가 제네바협약 위반임을 확인하고 이들의 송환을 북한에 촉구했습니다. 1994년 이후 탈북 귀환한 국군포로 80명 중 대부분은 돌아가시고 이제 6명만이 살아 계십니다. 승소한 탈북 귀환 국군포로 7인을 포함한 수만 명의 국군포로는 지난 70여년간 사법정의와 책임규명을 기다려왔습니다. 이에 우리는 지연된 정의는 정의가 아니라는 점을 상기하며, 대법원의 신속한 판결을 요청합니다. 감사합니다.

서명 단체 및 인사(2026년 1월 26일 기준)

물망초

6.25 국군포로가족회

북한인권시민연합(NKHR)

노체인

징검다리

THINK

전환기 정의 워킹그룹(TJWG)

이슈브리프 제1호 : 북한의 초국가적 억압

org — Tue, 28 Oct 2025 22:38:46 +0000

Issue Brief No.1 : North Korea’s Transnational Repression

org — Tue, 28 Oct 2025 22:38:08 +0000

한국의 사형 폐지

org — Tue, 28 Oct 2025 14:40:21 +0000

2025년 7월 9일 한국의 사형 폐지 이재명 대통령께 우리는 2024년 12월 3일 계엄 선포로 인한 민주주의의 퇴행이라는 중대한 우려 속에 새로이 선출된 이재명 정부에 사형 폐지를 재차 호소합니다. 한국은 1997년 12월 30일 이후 28년간 사형을 집행한 적이 없습니다. 사형제를 끝내는 것은 한국의 생명권을 포함한 인권을 존중하는 민주주의로의 전환을 촉진할 것입니다. 사형제 폐지는 분명 글로벌 트렌드입니다.¹ 한국에서 마지막 사형 집행이 있었던 1997년말 법적 및 실질적 사형 폐지국은 총 102개국(모든 범죄에 대한 사형 폐지국은 총 61개국)이었습니다.² 2007년말 한국이 실질적 사형 폐지국이 된 2007년말 법적 및 실질적 사형 폐지국은 총134개국(모든 범죄에 대한 사형 폐지국은 총 91개국)으로 늘어났습니다.³ 2024년말 그 수는 더 늘어나 총 145개국(모든 범죄에 대한 사형 폐지국은 총 113개국)이 되었습니다.⁴ 이 글로벌 트렌드는 유엔 총회에서의 표결 패턴에도 반영되고 있습니다. 2007년 12월 유엔 총회는 사상 최초의 사형집행 모라토리엄 결의인 결의 62/149호를 찬성 106표, 반대 46표, 기권 34표로 채택하였습니다.⁵ 2020년 12월 한국은 찬성 123표, 반대 38표, 기권 24표로 채택된 결의 75/183호에 찬성함으로써 격년으로 채택되어 온 결의 찬성국 대열에 처음으로 합류하였습니다.⁶ 2024년 12월 결의 79/179호는 역대 최다인 찬성 130표, 반대 32표, 기권 22표로 채택되었습니다.⁷ 우리는 사형 집행이 생명권을 포함한 기본적 인권을 존중할 한국의 국제법적 의무에 부합되지 않는다는 점을 상기합니다. 1993년 11월 23일 이후 거의 32년간을 사형 판결 하에 살아온 원언식 씨를 포함하여 57명이 여전히 사형수로 있는 것은 고문 및 그 밖의 잔혹한, 비인도적인 또는 굴욕적인 대우나 처벌을 방지할 한국의 국제법적 의무 위반에도 해당될 수 있습니다. 유엔 인권 전문가들은 최근 “사형수 현상(death row phenomenon)” (가혹한 감금 여건에서 임박한 사형 집행을 기다리며 장기간 사형수로 지내는 데 따른 심리적 효과)이 오랫동안 비인도적 대우로 규정되어 온 것을 재차 강조하였습니다.⁸ 앞서 1989년 유럽인권재판소는 소어링 대 영국(Soering v. United Kingdom) 사건에서 이를 근거로 미국으로의 조건 없는 범죄인 인도를 막은 바 있습니다.⁹ 어떠한 형사사법체계도 완벽하지 않다는 점에 주목하는 것이 중요합니다. 경찰, 검찰, 법원은 2000년 익산 약촌오거리 택시기사 살인사건 및 1988년 화성 연쇄살인 8차 사건에서 오심을 막지 못했습니다. 무죄가 밝혀진 사람은 언제든지 감옥에서 석방될 수 있지만 사형에 처해진 경우 되살릴 수 없습니다. 블랙스톤의 유명한 법언대로 10명의 죄인이 형벌을 면하는 것이 1명의 무고한 사람이 고초를 겪는 것보다 낫다면 당연히 10명의 죄인이 사형을 면하는 것이 1명의 무고한 사람이 처형되는 것보다 낫습니다. 우리는 또한 국회의원들이 1999년 이후 현 제21대 국회를 포함하여 매 대마다 총10건의 사형 폐지법안을 발의하고,¹⁰ 2018년 ‘사형제 폐지를 위한 시민적 및 정치적 권리에 관한 국제규약 제2 선택의정서’ 가입 지지 결의안을 발의한 것에 주목합니다.¹¹ 이들 법안 중에는 당시 국회의원의 절반 이상이 공동발의한 경우도 있었고, 지금 여당은 국회에서 필리버스터를 막을 수 있는 다수 의석을 점하고 있습니다. 정성호 법무부장관 지명자는 인권변호사 출신으로 2004년 이후 의원으로 재직했던 역대 국회에서 사형폐지법안을 일관되게 공동발의해왔습니다. 헌법재판소는 사형제에 대해 1996년 7대 2 표결(95헌바1), 2010년 5대 4 표결(2008헌가23)로 두 차례 합헌 결정을 내렸습니다. 그러나 이제 헌법재판소는 현재 계류 중인 사건(2019헌바59)에서 사형제에 대해 위헌 결정을 내림으로써 사형제 폐지의 길을 열 수 있습니다. 우리는 새 정부가 2020년 이후 유엔 총회의 사형집행 모라토리엄 결의 지지에 걸맞게 사형 폐지를 위한 진전을 이루기 위해 즉각 다음 조치를 취할 것을 정중히 요청합니다:

공식 사형 집행 모라토리엄을 선언할 것
광복절 특사, 신년 특사나 다른 기회에 모든 사형 선고를 형기로 감형할 것
새 정부의 국정과제에 사형 폐지를 위한 준비를 포함시킬 것
헌법재판소에 계류 중인 사형제 사건(2019헌바59)에 법무부장관의 의견서를 다시 제출하여 사형 존치를 지지하는 이전 의견서들로부터 거리를 두고 사형의 합헌성에 우려를 제기할 것
모든 범죄에 대한 사형 폐지를 목적으로 다양한 범죄에 대해 사형을 규정한 모든 법을 폐지하거나 개정할 것
‘사형제 폐지를 위한 시민적 및 정치적 권리에 관한 국제규약 제2 선택의정서’를 비준할 것

우리는 또한 한국이 강제송환 금지 원칙을 위반하여 사형 선고가 내려질 위험이 있는 경우에 미국¹², 일본, 중국¹³, 북한¹⁴ 등지로 사람을 추방 및 인도하는 것을 멈출 것을 촉구합니다. 우리는 2002년 자유권규약 위원회가 로저 저지 대 캐나다(Roger Judge v. Canada) 사건에서 “[사형에 관한 ‘시민적 및 정치적 권리에 관한 국제규약’ 제6조] 제2항에서 제6항의 예외는 ‘사형을 폐지하지 아니하고 있는’ 당사국만이 원용할 수 있다. 사형 폐지국의 경우, 사람을 실존하는 사형 집행의 위험에 노출시키지 않을 의무가 있다. 따라서 사형 폐지국은 개인들에게 사형이 선고될 것이 합리적으로 예상 가능한 경우, 이들을 사형 집행의 방지 보장 없이 추방이나 범죄인 인도를 통하여 자국 관할권으로부터 퇴거시킬 수 없다”고 한 것에 주목합니다.¹⁵ 끝으로 우리는 2025년 11월 7일부터 9일까지 일본 도쿄에서 제5차 동아시아 사형제 지역총회, 2026년 6월 30일부터 7월 3일까지 프랑스 파리에서 제9차 사형반대 세계총회가 열린다는 것에 주목합니다. 특히, 에마뉘엘 마크롱 프랑스 대통령이 개회하고 다른 나라의 국가원수와 각료가 참석할 파리 세계총회는 세계무대에서 한국의 높아진 위상을 강조할 훌륭한 기회가 될 것입니다. 우리는 사형 폐지를 향한 중요한 발걸음으로서 이재명 대통령과 다른 고위 정부 관리들이 도쿄 지역총회 및 파리 세계총회에 참여할 것을 호소합니다.

감사합니다.

서명자(2025년 7월 9일 기준)

단체

Abolition Death Penalty of Iraq Organization

ACAT - Belgique (Action des Chrétiens pour l'Abolition de la Torture)

ACAT - France (Action des chrétiens pour l’abolition de la torture)

ACAT - Germany (Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture)

Anti-Death Penalty Asia Network (ADPAN)

Balay Alternative Legal Advocates for Development in Mindanaw, Inc. (BALAOD Mindanaw)

Banglar Manabadhikar Surksha Mancha (MASUM)

Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR)

Bar Association of Puerto Rico (BAPR) / Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico (CAPR)

Capital Punishment Justice Project (CPJP)

Center for Legal Support and Inmates’ Rehabilitation (CELSIR)

Center for Prisoners’ Rights (CPR)

Centro para la Apertura y el Desarrollo de América Latina (CADAL)

Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants (CURE)

Coalition nigérienne contre la peine de mort (CONICOPEM)

Collectif français « Libérons Mumia ! »

Cornell Center on the Death Penalty Worldwide (CCDPW)

Crime Si Poa

CrimeInfo

Culture pour la Paix et la Justice (CPJ)

Death Penalty Focus

DITSHWANELO – The Botswana Centre for Human Rights

Droits et Paix (Rights and Peace)

Federal Association of Vietnamese Refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany

Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI)

Forum Marocain pour la Vérité et la Justice (FMVJ)

German Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty (GCADP)

HanVoice

Harm Reduction International (HRI)

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia (HCHRS)

Hope Behind Bars Africa (HBBA)

Human Asia

Human Rights Dallas

Human Rights Office Kandy

Human Rights Watch (HRW)

Humanity Diaspo

International Academic Network for the Abolition of Capital Punishment (REPECAP)

International Child Rights Center (InCRC)

International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)

Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO)

Italian Federation for Human Rights (FIDU - Federazione Italiana Diritti Umani)

Julian Wagner Memorial Fund (JWMF)

Juvenile Justice and Child Rights Committee of Lahore Bar Association

Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC)

Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ Kenya)

Korea Center for United Nations Human Rights Policy (KOCUN)

Legal Awareness Watch (LAW)

Lawyers For Human Rights International (LFHRI), India

Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Masyarakat (LBHM)

Lifespark

Malaysians Against Death Penalty and Torture (MADPET)

Moroccan Coalition Against the Death Penalty (CMCPM)

National Committee on North Korea (NCNK)

Nessuno tocchi Caino (Hands Off Cain)

Norden Directions

Observatoire Marocain des Prisons (OMP)

Odhikar

Papua New Guinea National Research Institute (PNG NRI)

Pax Christi Uvira

Programme Against Custodial Torture & Impunity (PACTI)

Rescue Alternatives Liberia (RAL)

Réseau des Associations de Défense des droits de l’Homme et des Militants Abolitionnistes de la peine de mort (RADHOMA)

Social Action, Rehabilitation and Rehabilitation Centre for Victims of Torture, War and Violence (SOHRAM-CASRA)

Society for Threatened Peoples (STP) / Geschäfte der Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker (GfbV)

Southern Methodist University Human Rights Program

Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty (TAEDP)

Together against the Death Penalty / Ensemble contre la peine de mort (ECPM)

The Advocates for Human Rights (TAHR)

Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG)

Union Chrétienne pour le Progrès et la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (UCPDHO)

Witness to Innocence (WTI)

Women Beyond Walls

World Coalition Against the Death Penalty (WCADP)

개인

Lord Alton of Liverpool / Independent Crossbench Member of the House of Lords & Co-chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea

Tomás Ojea-Quintana / Former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK

Download the Korean PDF

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2 Amnesty International, The death penalty worldwide: Developments in 1997, 31 March 1998, Index Number: ACT 50/004/1998, pp. 3 and 23, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/004/1998/en

4 Amnesty International, Death sentences and executions in 2024, 8 April 2025, Index Number: ACT 50/8976/2025, ANNEX II: ABOLITIONIST AND RETENTIONIST COUNTRIES AS OF 31 DECEMBER 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act50/8976/2025/en

5 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2007: 62/149. Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, A/RES/62/149, 26 February 2008, https://undocs.org/A/RES/62/149

6 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2020: 75/183. Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, A/RES/75/183, 28 December 2020, https://undocs.org/A/RES/75/183

7 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 2024: 79/179. Moratorium on the use of the death penalty, A/RES/79/179, 19 December 2024, https://docs.un.org/A/RES/79/179

9 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom (Application no. 14038/88), Judgment, (7 July 1989), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57619

12 강지남, “미국 보내면 사형… 제발 내 아들 살려주오”, 주간동아, 2008. 4. 2., https://weekly.donga.com/List/3/all/11/84713/1

15 HRC, Roger Judge v. Canada, Views, Communication No. 829/1998, para. 10.4, https://undocs.org/CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998

제80차 유엔 총회 채택 예정 2025년도 북한인권결의안

org — Tue, 28 Oct 2025 09:06:59 +0000

2025년 10월 28일 제80차 유엔 총회 채택 예정 2025년도 북한인권결의안 이재명 대통령께 우리는 제80차 유엔 총회에서 한국 정부가 연례 북한인권 결의안에 공동제안국으로 참여하여 국제사회와의 공고한 협력 하에 북한의 절박하고 계속되는 인권상황에 대응할 것을 촉구합니다. 북한의 인권상황이 심각하다는 사실은 잘 알려져 있습니다. 2014년 유엔 북한인권 조사위원회(COI DPRK)는 북한 정부가 국가 정책에 따라 “절멸, 살해, 노예화, 고문, 수감, 강간, 강제낙태와 기타 성폭력, 정치/종교/인종/성별을 이유로 한 박해, 주민의 강제이주, 사람들의 강제실종, 고의적으로 장기간 굶기는 비인도적 행위”를 포함한 인도에 반한 죄(crimes against humanity)를 자행했다고 판단했습니다. 이러한 판단에 따라 유엔 인권이사회와 총회는 북한의 인권침해를 강력히 규탄하고 책임규명 노력과 메커니즘의 강화를 요구하는 결의를 정기적으로 채택해왔습니다. 한국은 이러한 노력에서 불가결한 역할을 해왔습니다. 한국 정부는 2008년 말부터 2018년까지 매년 유엔 총회와 인권이사회에서 북한 인권의 증진과 보호를 요구하는 북한인권결의안에 공동제안국으로 참여하여 북한 주민의 기본권 증진을 위한 의지를 재확인했습니다. 그러나 우리는 이재명 정부의 대북 접근 방식이 기존에 한국의 인권에 대한 의지로부터 후퇴하는 것으로 보이는 것에 깊이 우려하고 있습니다. 지난 수개월간 한국 정부는 북한 쪽으로 정보가 담긴 풍선을 보내는 시민단체의 활동을 제한하고 대북 방송을 중단함으로써 북한 사람들에게 검열받지 않고 요긴한 정보를 제공하는 이니셔티브를 막았습니다. 8월 통일부는 연례 북한인권보고서 발간을 중단했고, 9월 탈북민 고용·창업 지원을 전담한 자립지원과를 해체했으며, 이번 달에는 인권인도실과 납북자대책팀 해체를 결정했습니다. 이들 조치는 총체적으로 북한 억압의 피해자에 대한 지지로부터 멀어지는 우려스러운 시그널이 되고 있습니다. 2019년부터 2022년까지 한국은 “한반도 평화와 번영”을 통한 북한인권 증진을 주장하며 북한인권결의안에 공동제안국으로 참여하기를 거부하였습니다. 그러나 이 접근 방식은 남북한 관계에 대한 종합적이거나 원칙에 입각한 정책을 반영하지 못했습니다. 한국 정부는 명시적으로, 그리고 묵시적으로 인권 고려를 배제했고, 책임규명과 피해자 보호를 희생해가면서 대북 관여를 추구했습니다. 가장 경악스러웠던 것은 2019년 11월 한국의 탈북 어부 2명 강제송환으로 이들을 거의 확실한 고문, 노예화, 그리고 강제실종 또는 처형이 기다리는 곳으로 돌려보낸 것이었습니다. 이 조치는 한국의 국내법상 의무와 개인이 고문이나 박해에 직면할 상당한 우려가 있는 곳으로의 강제송환을 금지하는 시민적 및 정치적 권리에 관한 국제규약과 고문 및 그밖의 잔혹한·비인도적인 또는 굴욕적인 대우나 처벌의 방지에 관한 협약 등 국제조약상 약속을 위반했습니다. 이러한 조치는 원칙 없는 관여 접근 방식의 깊은 도덕적 및 정책적 결점을 드러냈습니다. 2022년말 한국은 다시 북한인권 북한인권결의안에 공동제안국으로 복귀했습니다. 이재명 정부가 이제 올해 북한인권 결의안 공동제안을 포기한다면 이는 국내적으로, 그리고 국제적으로 깊이 우려스러운 시그널을 보내게 될 것입니다. 그러한 결정은 인권의 보편성을 무너뜨릴 뿐만 아니라 법의 지배와 인간의 존엄을 지키는 민주주의 국가로서 한국의 지위를 저하시킬 것입니다. 한국은 북한인권 문제에 리더십을 발휘해야 합니다. 이 중요한 결의안의 공동제안을 끝내는 것은 그 반대가 될 것입니다. 우리는 한반도의 지속가능한 평화는 인권 배제로 이룩할 수 없다는 점을 강조합니다. 한반도의 항구적 평화를 위해서는 북한내 불안정과 고통을 부채질하는 억압의 구조를 직면하는 것이 요구됩니다. 대화와 관여는 책임규명과 진실과 함께 가야 합니다. 진정한 화해는 북한의 끔찍한 인권침해에 대한 침묵이나 부정 위에 세워질 수 없기 때문입니다. 인권을 무시하는 것은 잠시 긴장이 완화된 것으로 보이게 할 수는 있지만 불안정을 부채질하는 문제점은 남아있고, 진짜 평화를 성취하는 것은 더욱 어렵게 됩니다. 우리는 2023년 12월 19일 유엔 총회 결의 78/218호 및 2024년 12월 17일 유엔총회 결의 79/181호가 북한의 북한의 대규모로, 국가 정책에 따른 다른 유엔 회원국 출신자를 포함한 사람들의 체계적 납치, 송환 거부 및 뒤이은 강제실종 및 전쟁포로의 송환 거부를 규탄하고, 북한에 모든 납북자, 억류자, 미송환 국군포로의 즉각 송환 실현을 촉구한 것에 주목합니다. 이들 사안은 한국으로서는 최상위 사안일 수밖에 없습니다. 우리는 대통령께서 대통령 취임 후 처음으로 맞이하는 유엔 총회의 연례 북한인권 결의안에 공동제안국으로 참여하여 북한의 중대한 인권문제에 대해 원칙에 입각한 입장을 취할 것을 요청합니다. 감사합니다. 서명자(2025년 10월 28일 기준) 단체 Centro para la Apertura y el Desarrollo de América Latina (CADAL) Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) Free Korea Association (FKA) Global Rights Compliance (GRC) HanVoice Human Asia Human Rights Foundation (HRF) Human Rights Watch (HRW) Human Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF) International Child Rights Center (InCRC) International Coalition to Stop Crimes Against Humanity in North Korea (ICNK) International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) Mental Health and Human Rights Info (MHHRI) No Fence Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (NKnet) North Korea Human Rights Network (NKHRN) People for Successful Corean Reunification (PSCORE) Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) Unification Academy 개인 Lord Alton of Liverpool / Independent Crossbench Member of the House of Lords & Co-chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea Roberta Cohen / Former Co-Chair of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

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[新聞稿] 北韓強迫失蹤罪行記錄與究責

org — Wed, 16 Jul 2025 23:30:54 +0000

北韓80年「強迫失蹤」罪行

首爾轉型正義工作組針對案例、受害者家屬困境及建議提出報告

報告全文詳見：https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea

The report will be available at https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea

（首爾時間2025年7月17日）位於首爾的轉型正義工作組（Transitional Justice Working Group, TJWG）發布英韓雙語最新報告「北韓強迫失蹤罪行的記錄與究責：評估與建議」。2014年，聯合國朝鮮民主主義人民共和國人權狀況調查委員會，在一份具有重大意義的報告中指出，北韓犯下包括「強迫失蹤」等危害人類的罪行，儘管報告發布至今已過了十年，這些犯罪行為仍持續發生，許多人依舊下落不明，加害者也未被追究責任。

總部位於首爾的非政府人權組織「轉型正義工作組」，其2024年出版的《不被允許的存在：北韓強迫失蹤犯罪調查》（Existing “Nowhere”: Looking into North Korea’s Crime of Enforced Disappearance）報告，以紀錄這些罪行為目的，進行了一項全面性的研究。過去的報告提供英文和韓文版本，本次發表的更新版，則同步發布西班牙文版，是由轉型正義工作組合作的阿根廷人權組織「人權與國際民主團結」（Derechos Humanos y Solidaridad Democrática Internacional, CADAL）負責翻譯。由於中南美洲西語國家過去的歷史中也發生強迫失蹤犯罪，工作組希望透過將報告翻譯為西班牙文，與這些國家分享研究成果。目前三種語言的報告可在轉型正義工作組官方網站取得：https://en.tjwg.org/publications/.

最新報告以過去的研究成果為基礎，闡述了受害者家屬和人權組織至今為打擊北韓強迫失蹤罪行，所進行的倡議過程及取得的成就。報告同時提出建議，呼籲主要利益相關者採取行動，改變官僚體系不作為和政治怠惰的情形，以促進案件紀錄和究責。

持續中的跨國犯罪

這份報告強調，北韓強迫失蹤犯罪並非過去式，而是正在進行的罪行，且因國際社會沒有採取行動阻止而持續至今。這些受害者包括：一、未被遣返的南韓戰俘（POWs）；二、韓戰時期被綁架的南韓平民；三、戰後被綁架的南韓平民；四、歸國的在日韓國僑胞；五、遭綁架的日本人及其他外國人；六、在中國、俄羅斯等國失蹤或被遣返的難民和脫北者；七、政治犯；八、宗教人士和遭北韓認定的「顛覆份子」；九、派遣至國外的北韓勞工和軍事人員；十、被送往偏遠島嶼的身障人士。

北韓境內：不透明的法律制度助長犯罪

報告中強調，北韓不透明的法律制度助長強迫失蹤犯罪，北韓公民無權查閱最高人民法院通過的法律，當局也無視國際社會對於公佈其已批准的人權公約內文的要求。北韓國家安全部（MSS）擁有自己的檢察官和「法官」，持續針對那些涉嫌犯下「危害國家及民族」罪行的人實施強迫失蹤，然而「危害國家及民族罪」這項罪名卻從未有明確的定義，且國家安全部同時掌控檢察官、法官、陪審團和行刑官等職位，幾乎擁有完全的自由裁量權。

北韓境外的跨國「強迫失蹤」未曾停止

報告指出，強迫失蹤案件往往始於北韓境外，尤其俄羅斯和中國與北韓當局密切合作，監控北韓難民和脫北者，並強行將他們遣返回北韓，自2011到2019年，俄羅斯當局僅批准了一名北韓人的庇護申請。轉型正義工作組敦促中國和俄羅斯停止與北韓合作、遵守「不遣返原則」，結束對脫北者和難民的強制遣返。中國和俄羅斯應終止與北韓簽訂的條約，以阻止此種讓強制遣返合法化的惡性循環情況。

應明確針對人權問題採取「目標性制裁」

轉型正義工作組持續紀錄加害者檔案，對象包括北韓國家安全部（MSS）及其他國家機關高階官員。報告強調，鎖定對強制遣返負有責任的個人或機構極其重要，未來才能以此作為刑事起訴和目標性制裁的依據（targeted sanctions）。

如果國際社會不採取公開行動，北韓領導層將缺乏誘因停止強迫失蹤犯罪。已訂定「馬格尼茨基制裁機制」的國家，應對北韓實施強迫失蹤，及其他嚴重人權侵犯行為負有最大責任的個人和實體實施制裁。沒有訂定此類目標性制裁法律的國家，也應制定相關機制並參與國際合作，支持那些致力於提供所需資訊的人權組織。

監督駐首爾聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處

「聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處駐首爾分部（UN Human Rights Office in Seoul）於2014年成立，其任務包括加強對北韓的究責，尤其是聯合國北韓人權調查委員會（COI）報告所指出的北韓境內危害人類罪行。該辦事處的運作長期仰賴聯合國成員國的財政捐助，然而，辦事處過去十年所取得的資訊和證據，能否有效用於司法及其他究責工作仍令人質疑。因此聯合國成員國是時候針對人權高專辦（OHCHR）的運作進行正式評估。更令人擔憂的是，人權高專辦一直不願直接點名中國和俄羅斯，而這兩國對於強行遣返北韓難民和脫北者所導致的強迫失蹤須負起主要責任。如果南韓政府及其他向聯合國提供捐助的成員國不點出這個問題，國際社會最終將耗費更多的時間和資源。」（轉型正義工作組代表李永煥）

南韓新政府不應逃避義務

「自李在明政府上台以來，包括未遣返的戰俘、戰時及戰後遭綁架者及傳教士，這些受害者的家屬日益憂慮，因為他們擔心前任政府的努力將面臨中斷。事實上，有跡象表明，新政府正以尋求改善與平壤的關係或對話為由，停止保護國民的義務。我們希望政府能和國際社會一起努力，以緩解中國及其他國家強行遣返北韓難民和脫北者的問題，以及在北韓境內所犯下的強迫失蹤罪行。」（轉型正義工作組分析師李昇炷博士）

追蹤調查：中國和俄羅斯境內的「強迫失蹤」和「跨國鎮壓」

「我們目前正針對在中國的北韓勞工及部署到俄羅斯的北韓士兵，所進行的『跨國鎮壓』犯罪展開調查，包括監視、任意拘留、強迫遣返以及強迫失蹤等情形。我們的目標是向各國提供特定案例、涉案國家機構，以及個別加害者的資訊，希望這些細節能被用於『禁止進口非法強迫勞動的產品』，並實施目標性制裁。」（轉型正義工作組專案主任朴誦雅）

轉型正義工作組（Transitional Justice Working Group, TJWG ) 2014年於南韓首爾成立，是一間致力於紀錄人權侵害案件和倡議的非政府組織。工作組以受害者權利為中心，針對試圖自武裝衝突或獨裁統治中轉型或尚未轉型的社會，找出解決大規模人權侵犯的最佳辦法，來實踐賠償及司法究責。轉型正義工作組也和那些在人權文獻記錄，及究責大規模暴行方面具有出色表現的組織和個人合作，並共享經驗。

[新闻稿] 朝鲜强迫失踪罪行记录与究责

org — Wed, 16 Jul 2025 23:28:18 +0000

朝鲜80年“强迫失踪”罪行

首尔转型正义工作组针对案例、受害者家属困境及建议提出报告

报告全文详见：https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea

The report will be available at https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea

On July 17, 2025 (Seoul time), the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) releases a new report titled Documentation and Accountability for North Korea’s Crime of Enforced Disappearance: Stock-taking and Recommendations. The report is available in Korean and English. （首尔时间2025年7月17日）位于首尔的转型正义工作组（Transitional Justice Working Group, TJWG）发布英韩双语最新报告“朝鲜强迫失踪罪行的记录与究责：评估与建议”。2014年，联合国朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人权状况调查委员会，在一份具有重大意义的报告中指出，朝鲜犯下包括“强迫失踪”等危害人类的罪行，尽管报告发布至今已过了十年，这些犯罪行为仍持续发生，许多人依旧下落不明，加害者也未被追究责任。总部位于首尔的非政府人权组织“转型正义工作组”，其2024年出版的《不被允许的存在：朝鲜强迫失踪犯罪调查》（Existing “Nowhere”: Looking into North Korea’s Crime of Enforced Disappearance）报告，以纪录这些罪行为目的，进行了一项全面性的研究。过去的报告提供英文和韩文版本，本次发表的更新版，则同步发布西班牙文版，是由转型正义工作组合作的阿根廷人权组织“人权与国际民主团结”（Derechos Humanos y Solidaridad Democrática Internacional, CADAL）负责翻译。由于中南美洲西语国家过去的历史中也发生强迫失踪犯罪，工作组希望透过将报告翻译为西班牙文，与这些国家分享研究成果。目前三种语言的报告可在转型正义工作组官方网站取得：https://en.tjwg.org/publications/. 最新报告以过去的研究成果为基础，阐述了受害者家属和人权组织至今为打击朝鲜强迫失踪罪行，所进行的倡议过程及取得的成就。报告同时提出建议，呼吁主要利益相关者采取行动，改变官僚体系不作为和政治怠惰的情形，以促进案件纪录和究责。 持续中的跨国犯罪 这份报告强调，朝鲜强迫失踪犯罪并非过去式，而是正在进行的罪行，且因国际社会没有采取行动阻止而持续至今。这些受害者包括：一、未被遣返的韩国战俘（POWs）；二、韩战时期被绑架的韩国平民；三、战后被绑架的韩国平民；四、归国的在日韩国侨胞；五、遭绑架的日本人及其他外国人；六、在中国、俄罗斯等国失踪或被遣返的难民和脱北者；七、政治犯；八、宗教人士和遭朝鲜认定的“颠覆份子”；九、派遣至国外的朝鲜劳工和军事人员；十、被送往偏远岛屿的身障人士。 朝鲜境内：不透明的法律制度助长犯罪 报告中强调，朝鲜不透明的法律制度助长强迫失踪犯罪，朝鲜公民无权查阅最高人民法院通过的法律，当局也无视国际社会对于公布其已批准的人权公约内文的要求。朝鲜国家安全部（MSS）拥有自己的检察官和“法官”，持续针对那些涉嫌犯下“危害国家及民族”罪行的人实施强迫失踪，然而“危害国家及民族罪”这项罪名却从未有明确的定义，且国家安全部同时掌控检察官、法官、陪审团和行刑官等职位，几乎拥有完全的自由裁量权。 朝鲜境外的跨国“强迫失踪”未曾停止 报告指出，强迫失踪案件往往始于朝鲜境外，尤其俄罗斯和中国与朝鲜当局密切合作，监控朝鲜难民和脱北者，并强行将他们遣返回朝鲜，自2011到2019年，俄罗斯当局仅批准了一名朝鲜人的庇护申请。转型正义工作组敦促中国和俄罗斯停止与朝鲜合作、遵守“不遣返原则”，结束对脱北者和难民的强制遣返。中国和俄罗斯应终止与朝鲜签订的条约，以阻止此种让强制遣返合法化的恶性循环情况。 应明确针对人权问题采取“目标性制裁” 转型正义工作组持续纪录加害者檔案，对象包括朝鲜国家安全部（MSS）及其他国家机关高阶官员。报告强调，锁定对强制遣返负有责任的个人或机构极其重要，未来才能以此作为刑事起诉和目标性制裁的依据（targeted sanctions）。如果国际社会不采取公开行动，朝鲜领导层将缺乏诱因停止强迫失踪犯罪。已订定“马格尼茨基制裁机制”的国家，应对朝鲜实施强迫失踪，及其他严重人权侵犯行为负有最大责任的个人和实体实施制裁。没有订定此类目标性制裁法律的国家，也应制定相关机制并参与国际合作，支持那些致力于提供所需资讯的人权组织。 监督驻首尔联合国人权事务高级专员办事处 "联合国人权事务高级专员办事处驻首尔分部（UN Human Rights Office in Seoul）于2014年成立，其任务包括加强对朝鲜的究责，尤其是联合国朝鲜人权调查委员会（COI）报告所指出的朝鲜境内危害人类罪行。该办事处的运作长期仰赖联合国成员国的财政捐助，然而，办事处过去十年所取得的资讯和证据，能否有效用于司法及其他究责工作仍令人质疑。因此联合国成员国是时候针对人权高专办（OHCHR）的运作进行正式评估。更令人担忧的是，人权高专办一直不愿直接点名中国和俄罗斯，而这两国对于强行遣返朝鲜难民和脱北者所导致的强迫失踪须负起主要责任。如果韩国政府及其他向联合国提供捐助的成员国不点出这个问题，国际社会最终将耗费更多的时间和资源。"（转型正义工作组代表李永焕） 韩国新政府不应逃避义务 “自李在明政府上台以来，包括未遣返的战俘、战时及战后遭绑架者及传教士，这些受害者的家属日益忧虑，因为他们担心前任政府的努力将面临中断。事实上，有迹象表明，新政府正以寻求改善与平壤的关系或对话为由，停止保护国民的义务。我们希望政府能和国际社会一起努力，以缓解中国及其他国家强行遣返朝鲜难民和脱北者的问题，以及在朝鲜境内所犯下的强迫失踪罪行。”（转型正义工作组分析师李升炷博士） 追踪调查：中国和俄罗斯境内的“强迫失踪”和“跨国镇压” “我们目前正针对在中国的朝鲜劳工及部署到俄罗斯的朝鲜士兵，所进行的‘跨国镇压’犯罪展开调查，包括监视、任意拘留、强迫遣返以及强迫失踪等情形。我们的目标是向各国提供特定案例、涉案国家机构，以及个别加害者的资讯，希望这些细节能被用于‘禁止进口非法强迫劳动的产品’，并实施目标性制裁。”（转型正义工作组专案主任朴诵雅）

转型正义工作组（Transitional Justice Working Group, TJWG ) 2014年于韩国首尔成立，是一间致力于纪录人权侵害案件和倡议的非政府组织。工作组以受害者权利为中心，针对试图自武装冲突或独裁统治中转型或尙未转型的社会，找出解决大规模人权侵犯的最佳办法，来实践赔偿及司法究责。转型正义工作组也和那些在人权文献记录，及究责大规模暴行方面具有出色表现的组织和个人合作，并共享经验。

보도자료 북한 강제실종범죄의 조사기록과 책임규명 이행 점검과 권고사항

org — Wed, 16 Jul 2025 23:21:12 +0000

북한의 강제실종범죄 80년 종합보고서,

사건과 피해가족 노력 조명하고 법〮외교 대응책 제시

보고서 전문 게시: https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea

The report will be available at https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea

이번 보고서는 북한의 강제실종범죄가 과거의 문제가 아니라, 국제사회의 대응 부족으로 지속되는 현재진행형 범죄임을 강조하고 있다. 피해자에는 (1) 미송환 국군포로, (2) 전시 민간인 납북자, (3) 전후 민간인 납북자, (4) 북송 교포, (5) 일본인과 그 밖의 외국인 납북자, (6) 중국, 러시아 등에서 실종 또는 북송된 난민과 탈북민, (7) 정치범수용소(관리소) 수감자, (8) 북한 내 신앙인과 ‘체제 전복자’로 지목된 사람들, (9) 북한의 해외파견 노동자와 러시아 파병 군인, (10) 외딴 섬으로 보내진 장애인들이 포함된다.

제도와 법적 사각지대에서 계속되는 범죄

보고서는 북한의 불투명한 법제도가 강제실종범죄를 가능하게 한다는 점을 보여준다. 북한 주민들은 최고인민회의에서 채택된 국내법조차 접할 수 없고, 국제적으로 가입한 인권조약 전문을 공표하라는 국제사회의 권고도 북한 당국은 무시해 왔다. 북한의 국가보위성은 자체적으로 검사와 ‘판사’를 두고서 ‘반국가 및 반민족 범죄' 혐의로 강제실종을 일삼고 있다. ‘반국가 및 반민족 범죄’는 현재까지 구체적으로 정의된 바 없다. 국가보위성은 검사, 판사, 배심원, 집행인 역할까지 거의 전적인 재량권을 행사하고 있다.

북한 밖에서 일어나는 초국가적 강제실종

보고서는 강제실종의 상당수가 북한 국경 밖에서부터 시작된다는 점을 강조한다. 러시아와 중국은 북한과 긴밀히 협력하여 탈북민을 감시하고, 북한으로 강제송환하고 있다. 러시아는 2011년부터 2019년까지 난민지위를 신청한 북한 사람들 중 단 한 명에게만 난민지위를 부여하였다. TJWG는 중국과 러시아 당국이 북한과의 공조와 탈북난민과 탈북민들을 강제송환하는 공범 행위를 멈출 것을 촉구한다. 강제송환은 강제송환금지(non-refoulement) 원칙을 명백히 위반하는 행위이므로 중국과 러시아는 강제송환의 악순환을 정당화해 온 북한과의 조약을 종료해야 한다.

인권 표적 제재 등 명시적 행동 필요

TJWG는 국가보위성과 기타 국가기관 소속의 고위직을 포함한 가해자들의 프로필을 작성하고 있다. 이번 보고서는 강제송환에 책임이 큰 개인 또는 기관들의 이름을 밝히는 일과 이를 향후 형사기소 및 특정 제재의 근거로 활용하는 것의 중요성을 강조하고 있다. 국제사회의 공개적이고 명시적인 행동이 없다면 북한지도부가 강제실종범죄를 중단할 동기도 생기지 않는다. 마그니츠키(Magnitsky) 표적제재틀이 있는 나라들은 강제실종범죄 등 중대한 인권침해에 대해서도 가해 기관과 개인들을 제재 대상으로 지정하고, 표적제재법이 없는 나라들은 이를 마련해 국제적 공조에 동참해야 한다. 아울러 제재에 필요한 정보를 수집하고 관심국들에 제공하려는 인권단체들을 지원하고 협력할 필요가 있다.

서울 유엔인권사무소와 OHCHR이 제 역할 하는지 확인하고 바로잡아야

“서울 유엔인권사무소는 COI가 2014년 지적한 북한의 반인도범죄 책임규명에 매진하도록 설립되었고 유엔 회원국들의 기여금으로 운영되고 있다. 그러나 지난 10여 년 간 수집한 정보와 증거가 책임규명에 쓰일 수 있을 만큼 질과 구체성을 갖추고 있는지 의문이다. 따라서 유엔회원국들은 유엔인권최고대표사무소(OHCHR)에 정식 요청하여 점검하고 확인할 때가 됐다. 아울러 이러한 유엔 조직들이 탈북난민과 탈북민을 강제북송하여 강제실종 문제에 책임이 큰 중국과 러시아를 직접 언급하기를 꺼리는 것도 반복되는 문제이다. 한국 정부를 비롯하여 유엔에 기여금을 내는 회원국들이 이 문제를 지적하고 시급히 바로잡지 않는다면 국제사회는 또 다른 시간과 자원을 낭비할까 우려된다.” — 이영환 대표

한국의 새 대통령에게: 국민보호 의무 외면하지 않고 국제적 노력에 동참해야

“이재명 정부가 시작된 이래, 피해가족들의 염려가 높아지고 있다. 억류가 장기화되고 있는 미송환 국군포로, 전시 및 전후 납북자, 선교사 등 억류국민의 가족들이다. 평양과의 관계 개선이나 대화를 추구한다는 이유로 앞선 정부 시기의 노력이 이어지지 않고 중단될 조짐을 보이니 걱정이 큰 것이다. 대통령과 정부는 다른 어떠한 이유로도 우리국민 보호 의무를 저버려서는 안 된다. 또한 북한의 긍정적 변화를 위해서도 중국 등에서의 탈북민 강제북송 문제와 북한 내부의 강제실종 문제에 대한 국제적 우려와 개선 노력에 동참하길 바란다.” — 이승주 박사, 프로파일러

후속 조사: 러시아와 중국으로 확장되는 강제실종과 초국가적 억압

“러시아 파병 군인과 중국 등지의 해외파견 노동자들에 대한 감시, 구금, 강제송환 등 초국가적 억압(transnational repression)과 북한이 해외에서 벌이는 강제실종 사건을 더 추적하고 있다. 구체적 사건과 연루기관 및 인물정보는 불법노동 제품 수입 규제와 표적 제재에 활용되도록 각 국 정부들에 제공할 것이다.” — 박송아, 프로젝트 디렉터

전환기정의워킹그룹(Transitional Justice Working Group)은 2014년 서울에 설립된 인권조사기록 및 애드보커시 NGO입니다. 무력분쟁이나 독재 체제로부터 전환 중이거나 아직 전환이 이루어지지 않은 사회에서 대규모 인권침해를 다루는 모범 사례를 개발하고, 피해자 중심 접근으로 배상을 실현하고 가해자 책임을 규명하는 것을 목표합니다. 대규모 잔학행위에 대한 인권 조사기록과 책임규명을 선도하는 기관 및 개인과 협력하고 경험을 공유합니다.

Press Release_Documentation and Accountability for North Koreas Crime of Enforced Disappearance

org — Wed, 16 Jul 2025 22:58:50 +0000

Report on 80 Years of

North Korea’s Crime of Enforced Disappearance

Seoul-based TJWG presents cases, victim families’ struggle, and proposed actions

The report will be available at https://en.tjwg.org/mapping-project-north-korea

On July 17, 2025 (Seoul time), the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) releases a new report titled Documentation and Accountability for North Korea’s Crime of Enforced Disappearance: Stock-taking and Recommendations. The report is available in Korean and English. In 2014, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Korea (COI DRPK) in its landmark report concluded that crimes against humanity—including enforced disappearance—have been committed in North Korea. Over a decade after the COI report, these crimes persist, individuals remain unaccounted for, and perpetrators have largely been held unaccountable. TJWG, a Seoul-based human rights NGO, has undertaken a comprehensive research effort to document these crimes in its 2024 publication, Existing “Nowhere”: Looking into North Korea’s Crime of Enforced Disappearance. While the report was previously available in English and Korean, TJWG is releasing the Spanish version along with the new report. The report was translated by TJWG’s Argentine partner human rights organization, Derechos Humanos y Solidaridad Democrática Internacional (CADAL, Human Rights and International Democratic Solidarity). By translating the report into Spanish, we aim to share our findings with Spanish-speaking countries in Central and South America, which have strong historical ties to the crime of enforced disappearance. Reports in all three languages are available at https://en.tjwg.org/publications/. This new report builds on prior findings, presenting recommendations based on the stock-taking of the advocacy efforts and milestones made thus far by victim families and human rights organizations to combat North Korea’s crime of enforced disappearance and presents recommendations for actions key stakeholders should take to overcome the bureaucratic and political inertia and inaction that impedes progress in promoting documentation and accountability. An ongoing and transnational crime The report highlights how enforced disappearance in North Korea is not a relic of the past but a continuing crime prolonged by lack of international action. Victims include 1) unrepatriated South Korean prisoners of war (POWs), 2) Korean War-era South Korean civilian abductees, 3) Post-war South Korean civilian abductees, 4) “Returnees” from Japan, 5) Japanese and other foreign abductees, 6) North Korean refugees disappeared in and/or repatriated from China, Russia and other countries, 7) Political prisoners, 8) Religious believers and ‘subversive influencers,’ 9) North Korea’s overseas workers and military personnel and 10) persons with disabilities transferred to a remote island. Inside North Korea, a systemic legal black hole enables the crime The report emphasizes the opaque nature of the North Korean legal system is designed to perpetuate crimes of enforced disappearances. North Korean citizens are not able to access laws adopted by the Supreme People’s Assembly and international calls to publish the text of ratified human rights treaties have gone unheeded. The Ministry of State Security employs its own prosecutors and ‘judges’, and perpetuates the crime of enforced disappearance of alleged offenders of ‘anti-state and anti-nation’ crimes that have never been clearly defined. Acting as the judge, jury, and executioner, the MSS operates without oversight or accountability. Outside North Korea, transnational enforced disappearance persists The report highlights that the crime of enforced disappearance often begins outside of North Korea’s borders. Russia and China maintain close cooperation with the North Korean state to monitor North Korean refugees and forcibly repatriate them back to North Korean soil. The report finds that from 2011-2019, Russian authorities only granted asylum status to a single North Korean. TJWG urges China and Russia to stop the complicity and end the forcible repatriation of North Korean refugees and escapees in violation of the principle of non-refoulement. China and Russia should terminate treaties with North Korea which have justified the cycle of enforced repatriation continues all too easily. Need for a definitive action: Targeted human rights sanctions TJWG continues to compile profiles of perpetrators, including high-ranking officials in the MSS and other state organs. The report stresses the importance of naming individuals and institutions responsible for disappearances and using this information to support future prosecutions and targeted sanctions. Without clear public action from the international community, the North Korean regime does not have any incentive to put a stop to the crime of enforced disappearances. Countries with Magnitsky-targeted sanctions framework should implement sanctions against individuals and entities most responsible for North Korea’s enforced disappearance and other grave human rights violations. Countries without such targeted sanctions laws should establish them to participate in international cooperation, as well as provide support to human rights organizations that are trying to provide the necessary information. Need for an Operational Assessment of the UN Human Rights Office in Seoul “The UN Human Rights Office in Seoul was established and mandated to strengthen accountability efforts for crimes against humanity committed in North Korea identified by the COI report in 2014. The office has been operating on financial contributions from the UN member states; however, the quality and usefulness of the information and evidence collected over the past 10 years for judicial and other accountability work remain questionable. It is time for UN member states to formally assess the OHCHR’s operation. Furthermore, it is also concerning that the OHCHR has been hesitant to directly name China and Russia, which are largely responsible for the enforced disappearance of North Korean refugees and escapees that stem from forcible repatriation. If the South Korean government and other member states that contribute to the UN do not bring up the issue at hand, I’m afraid that the international community will end up exhausting more time and resources.” — Hubert Younghwan Lee, Executive Director

북한 강제실종범죄의 조사기록과 책임규명 이행 점검과 권고사항

org — Wed, 16 Jul 2025 22:41:00 +0000